The logit-response dynamics

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 68, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 413-427

  Alós Ferrer, Carlos ^a   Netzer, Nick ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Best response potential games; Learning in games; Logit response dynamics

Indexed keywords

EID: 75349094737     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.004     Document Type: Article

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