Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play

Economics Letters

Volumn 109, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 31-33

  Naidu, Suresh ^a   Hwang, Sung Ha ^b   Bowles, Samuel ^c,d  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

^c SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF SIENA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Idiosyncratic play; Intentionality; Multiple equilibria; Nash bargaining solution; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955931487     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.07.005     Document Type: Article

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