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Volumn 65, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 626-643

Learning by trial and error

Author keywords

Adaptive dynamics; Bounded rationality; Learning; Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords


EID: 59249096487     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.011     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (174)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.