Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 88, Issue , 2014, Pages 90-111

  Sawa, Ryoji ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AIZU   (Japan)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Coalitions; Logit response dynamics; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84908156755     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.005     Document Type: Article

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