Coalitional stochastic stability

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 842-854

  Newton, Jonathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Coalition; Contract; Learning; Lexicographic; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860604567     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.014     Document Type: Article

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