Payoff-based dynamics for multiplayer weakly acyclic games

SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 373-396

  Marden, Jason R ^a   Young, H Peyton ^b   Arslan, Gürdal ^c   Shamma, Jeff S ^d  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^c University of Hawaii at Manoa   (United States)

^d GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperative control; Game theory; Learning in games

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY;

CO-OPERATIVE CONTROL; CONGESTION GAMES; DISTRIBUTED ROUTING; HIGH PROBABILITY; LEARNING IN GAMES; MULTIPLAYER GAMES; STRATEGY ADJUSTMENTS; UTILITY FUNCTIONS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 60349123721     PISSN: 03630129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1137/070680199     Document Type: Article

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