Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism

Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism

Volumn 9780199579969, Issue , 2011, Pages 1-320

  Enoch, David ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Deliberation; Indispensability; Meta normativity; Metaethics; Moral disagreement; Moral epistemology; Moral realism; Morality; Normativity; Objectivity; Robust realism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84945651397     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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