Truth as a Pretense

Fictionalism In Metaphysics

Volumn , Issue , 2023, Pages 134-177

  Woodbridge, James A ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 85195352691     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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