The Myth of the Seven

Fictionalism In Metaphysics

Volumn , Issue , 2023, Pages 88-115

  Yablo, Stephen ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85195337427     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (29)

1. Balaguer, Mark (1996). ‘A Fictionalist Account of the Indispensable Applications of Mathematics.’ Philosophical Studies, 83: 291–314.
2. Balaguer, Mark (2000). Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Balaguer, Mark (2001). ‘A Theory of Mathematical Correctness and Mathematical Truth.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 82: 87–114
4. Beaney, Michael (1997). The Frege Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
5. Burgess, John P. and Gideon Rosen (1997). A Subject With No Object, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
6. Field, Hartry (1980). Science Without Numbers. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
7. Field, Hartry (1989). Realism, Mathematics and Modality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
8. Geach, Peter T. and Max Black. (1960). Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
9. Hahn, L. and P. Schilpp (eds.) (1986). The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
10. Hills, David (1997). ‘Aptness and Truth in Verbal Metapher.’ Philosophical Topics, 25: 117–153.
11. Horgan, Terrance (1984). ‘Science Nominalized.’ Philosophy of Science, 51: 529–49.
12. Maddy, Penelope (1997). Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
13. Melia, Joseph (1995). ‘On What There’s Not.’ Analysis, 55: 223–9.
14. Moran, Richard (1989). ‘Seeing and Believing: Metaphor, Image, and Force.’ Critical Inquiry, 16: 87–112.
15. Moschovakis, Y. (1980). Descriptive Set Theory. Amsterdam: North Holland.
16. Putnam, Hilary (1971). Philosophy of Logic. New York: Harper & Row.
17. Quine, Willard Van Orman (1951). ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism.’ Philosophical Review, 60: 20–43. Reprinted in Quine (1961).
18. Quine, Willard Van Orman (1961). From a Logical Point of View, second edition. New York: Harper & Row.
19. Quine, Willard Van Orman (1986). ‘Reply to Parsons,’ in Hahn and Schilpp (1986).
20. Quine, Willard Van Orman (1992). Pursuit of Truth, revised edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
21. Sellars, Wilfrid (1997). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
22. Steiner, Mark (1998). The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
23. Walton, Kendall L. (1990). Mimesis and Make-Believe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
24. Walton, Kendall L. (1993). ‘Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe.’ European Journal of Philosophy, 1.1: 39–57.
25. Wigner, Eugene P. (1967). ‘The Unreasonable EVectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.’ In Symmetries and Reflections. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
26. Yablo, Stephen (1998). ‘Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 72: 229–61.
27. Yablo, Stephen (2002a). ‘Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 25: 72–102.
28. Yablo, Stephen (2002b). ‘Abstract Objects: A Case Study.’ Philosophical Issues, 12: 220–40.
29. Yablo, Stephen (forthcoming). ‘Content Carving, Some Ways.’ Philosophical Quarterly.