Subjective accounts of reasons for action

Ethics

Volumn 111, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 461-492

  Sobel, David ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039698128     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233523     Document Type: Article

References (90)

1. James Griffin, "Incommensurability: What's the Problem?" in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, ed. Ruth Chang (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 47, in speaking of indirect forms of utilitarianism writes that "although criterion and decision procedure can diverge, they are kept in the same general neighborhood by our capacities. Our decision procedures will, of course, be restricted by our capacities. But if a criterion becomes too remote from our capacities, it will cease serving as a criterion." Bernard Williams earlier had suggested that a radical split between truth-maker and decision procedure can create problems for utilitarianism. If one accepts such a split then it seems that it might happen that "utilitarianism has to vanish from making any distinctive mark in the world, being left only with the total assessment from the transcendental standpoint" (J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and against [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973], p. 135). This is apparently held to be bad news for the thesis of utilitarianism. As we will see later, if Williams's argument here was telling against utilitarianism (as I think it is not), it might be that Williams's own view of reasons would fall prey to the same sort of argument.
2. James Griffin, "Incommensurability: What's the Problem?" in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, ed. Ruth Chang (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 47, in speaking of indirect forms of utilitarianism writes that "although criterion and decision procedure can diverge, they are kept in the same general neighborhood by our capacities. Our decision procedures will, of course, be restricted by our capacities. But if a criterion becomes too remote from our capacities, it will cease serving as a criterion." Bernard Williams earlier had suggested that a radical split between truth-maker and decision procedure can create problems for utilitarianism. If one accepts such a split then it seems that it might happen that "utilitarianism has to vanish from making any distinctive mark in the world, being left only with the total assessment from the transcendental standpoint" (J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and against [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973], p. 135). This is apparently held to be bad news for the thesis of utilitarianism. As we will see later, if Williams's argument here was telling against utilitarianism (as I think it is not), it might be that Williams's own view of reasons would fall prey to the same sort of argument.
3. Few influential consequentialists have failed to notice that consequentialism is much better fitted for the role of truth-maker than decision procedure. See, among others, J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 405-6, 413, 489-90; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Amherst, Mass.: Prometheus, 1988), pp. 162-64; R. E. Bales, "Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure," American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 24-29, 31-45, 98-100; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), chaps. 2 and 3; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 257-65.
4. Few influential consequentialists have failed to notice that consequentialism is much better fitted for the role of truth-maker than decision procedure. See, among others, J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 405-6, 413, 489-90; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Amherst, Mass.: Prometheus, 1988), pp. 162-64; R. E. Bales, "Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure," American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 24-29, 31-45, 98-100; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), chaps. 2 and 3; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 257-65.
5. Few influential consequentialists have failed to notice that consequentialism is much better fitted for the role of truth-maker than decision procedure. See, among others, J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 405-6, 413, 489-90; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Amherst, Mass.: Prometheus, 1988), pp. 162-64; R. E. Bales, "Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure," American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 24-29, 31-45, 98-100; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), chaps. 2 and 3; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 257-65.
6. Few influential consequentialists have failed to notice that consequentialism is much better fitted for the role of truth-maker than decision procedure. See, among others, J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 405-6, 413, 489-90; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Amherst, Mass.: Prometheus, 1988), pp. 162-64; R. E. Bales, "Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure," American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 24-29, 31-45, 98-100; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), chaps. 2 and 3; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 257-65.
7. Few influential consequentialists have failed to notice that consequentialism is much better fitted for the role of truth-maker than decision procedure. See, among others, J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 405-6, 413, 489-90; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Amherst, Mass.: Prometheus, 1988), pp. 162-64; R. E. Bales, "Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure," American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 24-29, 31-45, 98-100; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), chaps. 2 and 3; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 257-65.
8. Few influential consequentialists have failed to notice that consequentialism is much better fitted for the role of truth-maker than decision procedure. See, among others, J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 405-6, 413, 489-90; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Amherst, Mass.: Prometheus, 1988), pp. 162-64; R. E. Bales, "Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure," American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 24-29, 31-45, 98-100; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), chaps. 2 and 3; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 257-65.
9. Few influential consequentialists have failed to notice that consequentialism is much better fitted for the role of truth-maker than decision procedure. See, among others, J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), chap. 2; Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 405-6, 413, 489-90; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Amherst, Mass.: Prometheus, 1988), pp. 162-64; R. E. Bales, "Act Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure," American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 24-29, 31-45, 98-100; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), chaps. 2 and 3; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 257-65.
10. It might seem that I am treating the fact that an account is epistemically relativized as criterial of its being a decision procedure. And this would be problematic since it seems that versions of consequentialism that morally require us to maximize expected (rather than actual) value could nonetheless sensibly claim to be accounts of the truth-maker of moral claims despite being epistemically relativized. But notice that my case hinges on claiming that the fact that an account is not epistemically relativized shows that it cannot sensibly be thought to be an account of the proper decision procedure. I can allow that some epistemic relativization is possible in some accounts of truth-makers and merely insist that the lack of epistemic relativization in a theory is incompatible with interpreting the theory to be an account of proper decision procedures for finitely rational creatures like ourselves. I must here resist the temptation to argue that the seeming plausibility of the version of consequentialism that recommends the maximization of expected utility is itself partly the result of the confusion between truth-makers and decision procedures. I thank an anonymous referee for urging me to be clearer about all this.
11. Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 18, makes a comparable distinction. He writes that "one problem for any 'full awareness' account such as Brandt's is that rationality, in the ordinary sense, often consists not of using full information, but of making the best use of limited information. Acting in full awareness of all relevant facts suggests not rationality, but something more like 'advisability'. Whereas rationality is a matter of making use of the information one has, advice can draw on information the advisee lacks." See also pp. 89-92.
12. Of course we might also call someone practically irrational on the grounds that she does not act in accord with her sensible deliberation.
13. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 460. This formulation is clearly better than the comparable one Hume offers at Treatise, p. 416, where he writes, "Tis only in two senses that any affection can be call'd unreasonable. First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for the desig'd end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects." This formulation of the former error is inferior because it fails to allow room for cases in which the object that is the foundation of our attitude actually exists, but, if we brought it nearer or had first-hand familiarity with it, we would alter our attitude. This is exactly the possibility that the later formulation allows. Further page numbers in the text refer to Hume's Treatise.
14. Some modern interpreters of Hume have claimed that his view is that no action can be contrary to reason. Hence rather than really being the founder of Humean instrumentalist accounts, he was a full-fledged skeptic about the powers of reason to have anything at all to say about action. See Rachel Cohon, "Hume and Humeanism in Ethics," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1988): 99-116; and Elijah Millgram, "Was Hume a Humean?" Hume Studies 21 (1995): 75-93. Korsgaard concurs with the picture of Hume as a radical skeptic about practical reason and, for that matter, theoretical reason, in "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 223, n. 23, and p. 229, n. 36.
15. Some modern interpreters of Hume have claimed that his view is that no action can be contrary to reason. Hence rather than really being the founder of Humean instrumentalist accounts, he was a full-fledged skeptic about the powers of reason to have anything at all to say about action. See Rachel Cohon, "Hume and Humeanism in Ethics," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1988): 99-116; and Elijah Millgram, "Was Hume a Humean?" Hume Studies 21 (1995): 75-93. Korsgaard concurs with the picture of Hume as a radical skeptic about practical reason and, for that matter, theoretical reason, in "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 223, n. 23, and p. 229, n. 36.
16. Some modern interpreters of Hume have claimed that his view is that no action can be contrary to reason. Hence rather than really being the founder of Humean instrumentalist accounts, he was a full-fledged skeptic about the powers of reason to have anything at all to say about action. See Rachel Cohon, "Hume and Humeanism in Ethics," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1988): 99-116; and Elijah Millgram, "Was Hume a Humean?" Hume Studies 21 (1995): 75-93. Korsgaard concurs with the picture of Hume as a radical skeptic about practical reason and, for that matter, theoretical reason, in "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 223, n. 23, and p. 229, n. 36.
17. It would have seemed open to Hume to claim that acts or passions that would only result from such false judgments are themselves defective on grounds other than that they are false.
18. It is worth noting that it must also be this "improper" understanding of Hume that Korsgaard is working with when she writes, in "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 228, that "Hume . . . does explicitly allow that actions can be irrational in two derivative ways: we act 'irrationally' when our passions are provoked by non-existent objects, or when we act on the basis of false causal judgements." I take it that Korsgaard's use of the word "derivative" and her putting in scare quotes "irrationally" signals that she is trying to understand, as I am, what Hume's "improper" criticism of acts and passions amounts to.
19. Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in his Moral Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 102 . Michael Smith's notion of proper deliberation in The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) is quite similar and explicitly builds on Williams's account. However, Smith claims that desiring to get X after proper deliberation only provides one with a reason to get X if all rational agents would converge in their desires. Smith also argues that we have good reasons to expect such a convergence. I argue against both of Smith's claims in "Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?" Analysis 59 (July 1999): 137-47.
20. Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in his Moral Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 102 . Michael Smith's notion of proper deliberation in The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) is quite similar and explicitly builds on Williams's account. However, Smith claims that desiring to get X after proper deliberation only provides one with a reason to get X if all rational agents would converge in their desires. Smith also argues that we have good reasons to expect such a convergence. I argue against both of Smith's claims in "Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?" Analysis 59 (July 1999): 137-47.
21. Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in his Moral Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 102 . Michael Smith's notion of proper deliberation in The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) is quite similar and explicitly builds on Williams's account. However, Smith claims that desiring to get X after proper deliberation only provides one with a reason to get X if all rational agents would converge in their desires. Smith also argues that we have good reasons to expect such a convergence. I argue against both of Smith's claims in "Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?" Analysis 59 (July 1999): 137-47.
22. Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," p. 104.
23. See ibid.
24. Ibid., pp. 102-3.
25. Williams, in rehashing the petrol example, remarks that "we are allowed to change - that is, improve or correct - his beliefs of fact and his reasoning in saying what it is he has reason to do." Our license for doing so does not stem from the agent's poor use of available information but rather from the thought that "what he wants is a drink of gin and tonic." See "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," in his Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 36.
26. Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," p. 103.
27. Williams, in "Internal and External Reasons," p. 103, writes that "the internal reasons conception is concerned with the agent's rationality." Additionally, Williams confusingly writes that "A may be ignorant of some fact such that if he did know it he would, in virtue of some element in S, be disposed to φ: we can say that he has a reason to φ, though he does not know it. For it to be the case that he actually has such a reason, however, it seems that the relevance of the unknown fact to his actions has to be fairly close and immediate; otherwise one merely says that A would have a reason to φ if he knew the fact" (p. 103). I think the last claim here shows that Williams is sometimes incoherently trying to straddle the line between an account of reasons for action and an account of rationality. But even here note that Williams does not require that the unknown fact be one that the agent was in any sense culpable for not knowing. Hume writes, "A person may also take false measures for the attaining his end, and may retard, by his foolish conduct, instead of forwarding the execution of any project" (p. 459). The word 'foolish' here is troubling for my interpretation. It is also very awkward in Hume's context. In this and surrounding passages, Hume stresses merely the truth or falsity of the judgment, not its wisdom or stupidity. It is not at all clear why Hume thinks he has earned the right to call such "false measures" foolish rather than merely mistaken. Not all mistakes are foolish, and he tells us nothing about this false measure that helps us see why it counts as foolish.
28. In "Internal Reasons and the Obscur ty of Blame," p. 35, Williams announces that he thinks this constitutes a sufficient condition as well. I argue against the stability of the necessary but not sufficient view in the context of well-being, in " On the Subjectivity of Welfare," Ethics 107 (1997): 501-8. David Copp, in his Morality Society, and Normativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), chap. 9, offers an interesting position in which one's subjectively valuing 0 is sufficient but not necessary to the existence of reasons to achieve 0. Copp claims that one's nonsubjectively determined needs provide an independent source of reasons that can conflict with one's values.
29. In "Internal Reasons and the Obscur ty of Blame," p. 35, Williams announces that he thinks this constitutes a sufficient condition as well. I argue against the stability of the necessary but not sufficient view in the context of well-being, in " On the Subjectivity of Welfare," Ethics 107 (1997): 501-8. David Copp, in his Morality Society, and Normativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), chap. 9, offers an interesting position in which one's subjectively valuing 0 is sufficient but not necessary to the existence of reasons to achieve 0. Copp claims that one's nonsubjectively determined needs provide an independent source of reasons that can conflict with one's values.
30. In "Internal Reasons and the Obscur ty of Blame," p. 35, Williams announces that he thinks this constitutes a sufficient condition as well. I argue against the stability of the necessary but not sufficient view in the context of well-being, in " On the Subjectivity of Welfare," Ethics 107 (1997): 501-8. David Copp, in his Morality Society, and Normativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), chap. 9, offers an interesting position in which one's subjectively valuing 0 is sufficient but not necessary to the existence of reasons to achieve 0. Copp claims that one's nonsubjectively determined needs provide an independent source of reasons that can conflict with one's values.
31. Stephen Darwall's formulation of "existence internalism" in Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 55, and his "metaphysical internalism" in "Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction," in Moral Discourse and Practice, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 308-9, are both, like Williams's view, formulated in terms of necessary conditions for being a reason. Thus these versions of internalism are also subject to the importantly different interpretations mentioned in the text. Darwall briefly notes this ambiguity in the latter discussion.
32. Stephen Darwall's formulation of "existence internalism" in Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 55, and his "metaphysical internalism" in "Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction," in Moral Discourse and Practice, ed. Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 308-9, are both, like Williams's view, formulated in terms of necessary conditions for being a reason. Thus these versions of internalism are also subject to the importantly different interpretations mentioned in the text. Darwall briefly notes this ambiguity in the latter discussion.
33. Michael Smith's account of reasons for action in The Moral Problem is best understood as a version of tracking internalism. He thinks that the desires of all ideally rational agents converging on certain things is necessary and sufficient for our having reasons, and, in particular, reason to do what we would so converge on. But, according to Smith, the best explanation for such a convergence, if it occurred, would be that there are "extremely unobvious a priori moral truths" (p. 187). On his view, it is these truths that make it the case that we have reasons to do certain things and our ideally informed deliberations simply gets our motivations to track these truths. The view Peter Railton offered in 1986 also looks to be tracking internalism rather than truth-making internalism. See his "Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 5-29, p. 25,
34. and "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review 96 (1986): 163-207, pp. 175-76, n.17.
35. Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," p. 35.
36. Railton seems to have initiated this way of thinking of the ideal deliberator. See his "Facts and Values," p. 16.
37. Although such a picture would produce a more adequate account of reasons for action, it would falsify Williams's version of internalism and his explanation condition. Or so I argue in my "Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action," Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 18 (Summer 2001). There I argue that the best subjectivist account of reasons for action must reject Williams's understanding of internalism as well as his claim that "if it is true A has a reason to φ, then it must be possible that he should φ for that reason" (Williams, "Internalism and the Obscurity of Blame," p. 39).
38. Although such a picture would produce a more adequate account of reasons for action, it would falsify Williams's version of internalism and his explanation condition. Or so I argue in my "Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action," Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 18 (Summer 2001). There I argue that the best subjectivist account of reasons for action must reject Williams's understanding of internalism as well as his claim that "if it is true A has a reason to φ, then it must be possible that he should φ for that reason" (Williams, "Internalism and the Obscurity of Blame," p. 39).
39. Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), pp. 10 and 113.
40. Ibid., p. 13.
41. Ibid.
42. In a conversation late in his life, Brandt told me that he regarded Railton's discussion of such issues as an improvement on his own because Railton's version of cognitive psychotherapy required all information rather than merely available information. I think this suggests that we do best to understand Brandt to have really been trying to capture the notion of a reason rather than rationality.
43. Mill, chap. 2; Sidgwick, pp. 111-12; Brandt, pp. 10, 113, 329; Hare, pp. 101-5 and 214-16. See also Douglas Senor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 217-18; James Griffin, in Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 407-24; Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. II; Railton, "Facts and Values"; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen and Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism and some would decline the label.
44. Mill, chap. 2; Sidgwick, pp. 111-12; Brandt, pp. 10, 113, 329; Hare, pp. 101-5 and 214-16. See also Douglas Senor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 217-18; James Griffin, in Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 407-24; Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. II; Railton, "Facts and Values"; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen and Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism and some would decline the label.
45. Mill, chap. 2; Sidgwick, pp. 111-12; Brandt, pp. 10, 113, 329; Hare, pp. 101-5 and 214-16. See also Douglas Senor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 217-18; James Griffin, in Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 407-24; Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. II; Railton, "Facts and Values"; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen and Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism and some would decline the label.
46. Mill, chap. 2; Sidgwick, pp. 111-12; Brandt, pp. 10, 113, 329; Hare, pp. 101-5 and 214-16. See also Douglas Senor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 217-18; James Griffin, in Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 407-24; Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. II; Railton, "Facts and Values"; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen and Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism and some would decline the label.
47. Mill, chap. 2; Sidgwick, pp. 111-12; Brandt, pp. 10, 113, 329; Hare, pp. 101-5 and 214-16. See also Douglas Senor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 217-18; James Griffin, in Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 407-24; Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. II; Railton, "Facts and Values"; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen and Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism and some would decline the label.
48. Mill, chap. 2; Sidgwick, pp. 111-12; Brandt, pp. 10, 113, 329; Hare, pp. 101-5 and 214-16. See also Douglas Senor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 217-18; James Griffin, in Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 407-24; Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. II; Railton, "Facts and Values"; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen and Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism and some would decline the label.
49. Mill, chap. 2; Sidgwick, pp. 111-12; Brandt, pp. 10, 113, 329; Hare, pp. 101-5 and 214-16. See also Douglas Senor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 217-18; James Griffin, in Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 407-24; Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. II; Railton, "Facts and Values"; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen and Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism and some would decline the label.
50. Mill, chap. 2; Sidgwick, pp. 111-12; Brandt, pp. 10, 113, 329; Hare, pp. 101-5 and 214-16. See also Douglas Senor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 217-18; James Griffin, in Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 407-24; Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. II; Railton, "Facts and Values"; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen and Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism and some would decline the label.
51. Mill, chap. 2; Sidgwick, pp. 111-12; Brandt, pp. 10, 113, 329; Hare, pp. 101-5 and 214-16. See also Douglas Senor and N. Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp. 217-18; James Griffin, in Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 11-17; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 407-24; Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 2; Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pt. II; Railton, "Facts and Values"; David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 63 (1989): 113-37; John Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Sen and Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 55. Several important caveats apply to some of the above authors' commitments to subjectivism and some would decline the label.
52. Sidgwick, pp. 111-12. Robert Shaver, "Sidgwick's False Friends," Ethics (1997): 314-20, helpfully reminds us that Sidgwick ultimately qualified this view in a way that limits its claim to being a subjective account. I dispute Shaver's further claim that Sidgwick had good reason to so qualify his view in my "Reply to Shaver," in the e-journal BEARS, http:// www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/homepage.html (1997).
53. I take this example from Griffin's Well-Being, p. 11.
54. Railton offers this account in "Facts and Values," p. 16. Notice that Railton's compelling claim that it would be "an intolerably alienated conception of someone's good to imagine that it might fail in any way to engage him" (p. 9) is also compatible with a merely tracking claim. In his more recent work, Railton claims that the subjective reactions from the approved vantage point are indicators of the presence of a fit between an individual and an end. See his "Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism," in Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, ed. Jarrold Levinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
55. Railton, "Facts and Values," p. 14. But consider that our idealized self could want our ordinary self to want x because the idealized agent knows that our ordinary self's doing so will be instrumentally effective in bringing about, albeit unintentionally, y, which is what the idealized agent finds to be best for our ordinary self. If we say that what is good for our ordinary self is what our idealized self wants our ordinary self to want, we seem to misdescribe these cases of indirection. Perhaps it would be better to focus on the kind of life the idealized agent wants the ordinary self to have.
56. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem, chap. 5, adopts the spirit of Railton's move. Connie Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good," Ethics 105 (1995): 296-325, extensively considers such views, which she helpfully labels "Ideal Advisor" accounts.
57. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem, chap. 5, adopts the spirit of Railton's move. Connie Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good," Ethics 105 (1995): 296-325, extensively considers such views, which she helpfully labels "Ideal Advisor" accounts.
58. A recent criticism of such accounts is that there are serious conceptual difficulties in attempting to specify the fully informed vantage point. See my "Full Information Accounts of Well-Being," Ethics 104 (1994): 784-810; and Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good." Such complaints retain whatever force they have against full information accounts of well-being when deployed against full information accounts of reasons for action.
59. A recent criticism of such accounts is that there are serious conceptual difficulties in attempting to specify the fully informed vantage point. See my "Full Information Accounts of Well-Being," Ethics 104 (1994): 784-810; and Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good." Such complaints retain whatever force they have against full information accounts of well-being when deployed against full information accounts of reasons for action.
60. Kant claimed that "in studying the moral knowledge of ordinary human reason we have now arrived at its first principle. This principle it admittedly does not conceive thus abstractly in its universal form; but it does always have it actually before its eyes, and does use it as a norm of judgement" (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton [New York: Harper & Row, 1964], p. 71). This backs away from claiming that the categorical imperative is the decision procedure of "ordinary human reason." It is unclear what ordinary people do that counts as close enough to having the categorical imperative "before its eyes." I take it to be a problem if only a handful of academics have a shot at invoking an approved decision procedure. Yet the relationship between the categorical imperative and an approved decision procedure available to nonacademics seems obscure. Some have suggested to me that the common thought of "What if everyone did that?" might count as invoking a recognizably Kantian thought as part of one's decision procedure. Presumably the Kantian needs a merely instrumental understanding of the relationship between the truth-maker and the decision procedure.
61. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have written much about actual human heuristics and biases. See esp. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Such heuristics and biases will, of course, sometimes lead us to act contrary to our genuine reasons but this is not sufficient to show that adopting them as part of one's decision procedure is irrational. It would be a drastic mistake to reject all such heuristics and biases on the grounds that even the best are fallible.
62. Smith, The Moral Problem, pp. 177-80. Gauthier (p. 31), in passing, also supports such a view.
63. Smith, The Moral Problem, p. 177.
64. David Copp, in "Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith's The Moral Problem," Ethics 108 (1997): 33-54, offers comparable considerations against Smith. Copp considers Smith's attempt to insist on an identity between (1) thinking one has a reason to φ and (2) thinking one would be motivated from Smith's vantage point to φ. Copp persuasively argues that even if there were an identity between 1 and 2 above, this would not solve Smith's problem. Even if Clark Kent is Superman we are not rationally required to treat them as the same person unless available evide nee rationally requires us to believe that Clark Kent is Superman. Smith needs the identity between 1 and 2 to not only be true but to play a role in the agent's mental economy. Smith at least needs the claim that one cannot rationally reject the thought that 1 is identical to 2 and not merely the claim that they are identical. See Copp, pp. 38-43.
65. Smith, The Moral Problem, p. 177.
66. For a fascinating discussion of the extent to which an internalist account of the truth-maker must not only specify an idealization process and claim that being motivated to φ from that vantage point is necessary for having a reason to φ but must also ensure that the idealization procedure itself connects up with the agent's concerns in the right way, see Connie Rosati's "Internalism and the Good for a Person," Ethics 106 (1996): 297-326. Roughly, Rosati's view can be seen as an attempt to ensure that a rational agent would be motivated by her beliefs about what she would want after ideal deliberation by allowing the agent's current concerns to inform what counts as ideal deliberation for her. Rosati calls such a view "two-tier" internalism. If Smith accepted Rosati's two-tier internalism he might be able to get the connection between reasons and rationality he was looking for but perhaps at the price of losing the cognitivism of the view. Rosati herself tells us that her view "makes room for what might be a quite plausible antirealism" (p. 325).
67. See Rachel Cohon, "Internalism about Reasons for Action," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993): 265-88. Although Cohon (wrongly, I would say) supposes that this is Williams's argument, she (rightly, I would say) sues that this purported disanalogy with external views cannot be sustained.
68. Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), quotations on 11 and 23, respectively.
69. Obviously the subjectivist does not want to suggest that there are substantive standards for desire that are specifiable independently from ideal deliberation (in the way that many think that truth does supply deliberation independent standards for belief). See David Velleman, "The Possibility of Practical Reason," Ethics 106 (1996): 694-726. The point is that what counts as ideal deliberation in this sense will be very different than what counts as rational deliberation.
70. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 230. Such claims are quickly summarized in Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 163-64.
71. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 230. Such claims are quickly summarized in Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 163-64.
72. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 220.
73. Smith, The Moral Problem, p. 145. Smith goes on to consider the prospects of the Humean appealing to a differential authority between different kinds of desires. He seems unconvinced but merely concludes that the Humean would have to offer a rationale for the differential authority.
74. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 253.
75. Ibid., p. 228. Again, I take it Korsgaard's official view is that Hume thinks there is no such thing as practical reason. What she says here must be understood to be developing a Humean account that Hume himself found "improper."
76. Ibid.
77. Korsgaard also claims in "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 220, that "after all, a person may be conditioned to do the correct thing as well as the incorrect thing; but the correctness of what she is conditioned to do does not make her any more rational." She also writes that "the rationality of action depends on the way in which the person's own mental activity is involved in its production, not just on its accidental conformity to some external standard" (p. 236). These passages make clear that Korsgaard's concern is with the agent's decision procedure, or what I have been calling the agent's rationality', rather than with her reasons.
78. This additional premise is permissible if Korsgaard's argument is intended only against David Hume. But Korsgaard makes clear that she intends to be arguing with Humeans quite generally. Against this broader position, the use of this premise is contentious. Surely most Humeans admit that Hume made some mistakes and this looks like one of them. Further, Korsgaard has not made a case that Hume's commitment to this sentence runs deep.
79. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 228.
80. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason."
81. Ibid., pp. 11-12. Emphasis in original.
82. Ibid. This general thrust of this paper leans less heavily on these thoughts than the later paper. Thus I think it significantly less hurt by my case. Indeed, for what it is worth, I find the earlier paper's central points convincing.
83. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 228.
84. Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," p. 103.
85. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 238. Korsgaard, in The Sources of Normativity, pp. 163-64, reiterates that it is impossible to violate the hypothetical imperative as the instrumentalist must conceive it and concludes that therefore the instrumental principle cannot be a normative principle.
86. Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 238. Korsgaard, in The Sources of Normativity, pp. 163-64, reiterates that it is impossible to violate the hypothetical imperative as the instrumentalist must conceive it and concludes that therefore the instrumental principle cannot be a normative principle.
87. I suppose Korsgaard could continue to claim that although the Humean view understood as I describe it leaves plenty of room for us to act contrary to its recommendations, nonetheless it cannot serve as a useful practical guide in actual (rather than counterfactual) deliberation. My response to such a line is that this is not what the Humean view aspires to be. Perhaps it will be claimed that this very notion of a reason that might not be able to serve as a useful practical guide in actual deliberation is somehow bankrupt. I think, on the contrary, that this is a commonsense notion that we would have difficulty doing without. The comparisons I offer with the concept of well-being in Sec. I, subsection D, might be helpful here.
88. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," p. 12.
89. Ibid., p. 15.
90. Korsgaard tells us that Hume is not the real target of her critique but rather Humeans in "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," pp. 229-30, n. 36.