The Possibility of Practical Reason

Ethics

Volumn 106, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 694-726

  Velleman, J David ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040280272     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233669     Document Type: Article

References (95)

1. This principle is meant to apply only to complete sets of reasons, not to reasons taken individually. That is, if a particular consideration counts as a reason only in the context of a larger set or series of considerations, then it need not be capable of swaying the agent unless it is considered in that context. The assumption that 'reasons' denotes complete sets of reasons will be in force throughout the following discussion. I shall also rely on the success-grammar of the word 'considerations': considerations are, by implication, true considerations - or, as I shall sometimes call them, facts.
2. The last clause is meant to account for cases like this: "It may be true of me that were the aroma of fresh apple pie to waft past my nose I would be moved to discover its source and perhaps to try to wangle a piece. It does not follow from this, however, that before I smell the pie I desire to eat it or to eat anything at all" (Stephen L. Darwall, Impartial Reason [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983], p. 40). Here apple pie is something that the agent doesn't yet want but will want once he considers its attainability, and so considerations about how to obtain it are capable of influencing him in the requisite way. I take it that this mechanism is what David Hume regarded as the first of the two ways in which reason can influence action: "Reason . . . can have an influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion" (A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge [Oxford: Clarendon, 1978], p. 459).
3. The last clause is meant to account for cases like this: "It may be true of me that were the aroma of fresh apple pie to waft past my nose I would be moved to discover its source and perhaps to try to wangle a piece. It does not follow from this, however, that before I smell the pie I desire to eat it or to eat anything at all" (Stephen L. Darwall, Impartial Reason [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983], p. 40). Here apple pie is something that the agent doesn't yet want but will want once he considers its attainability, and so considerations about how to obtain it are capable of influencing him in the requisite way. I take it that this mechanism is what David Hume regarded as the first of the two ways in which reason can influence action: "Reason . . . can have an influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion" (A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge [Oxford: Clarendon, 1978], p. 459).
4. Note that I am not using the word 'inclination' in its Kantian sense. I am using it as the generic term for conative or motivational states of all kinds.
5. The argument presented here is discussed at length in Darwall, Impartial Reason, esp. chaps. 2 and 5.
6. Hume, p. 415. I do not claim that the argument offered above for Hume's conclusion should necessarily be attributed to Hume.
7. The most frequent target has been the second assumption, which is sometimes called the Humean theory of motivation. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 52 (1978): 13-29; Darwall, Impartial Reason, chap. 5; Rachel Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" Ethics 96 (1986): 545-56. For arguments defending this assumption, see Michael Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation," Mind 96 (1987): 36-61; and Alfred Mele, "Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning," Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-36. Arguments against the first assumption are rare, although some philosophers have argued against a related assumption applied to moral requirements rather than reasons for acting. See, e.g., William Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," in Essays on Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 40-81; and David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 3.
8. The most frequent target has been the second assumption, which is sometimes called the Humean theory of motivation. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 52 (1978): 13-29; Darwall, Impartial Reason, chap. 5; Rachel Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" Ethics 96 (1986): 545-56. For arguments defending this assumption, see Michael Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation," Mind 96 (1987): 36-61; and Alfred Mele, "Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning," Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-36. Arguments against the first assumption are rare, although some philosophers have argued against a related assumption applied to moral requirements rather than reasons for acting. See, e.g., William Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," in Essays on Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 40-81; and David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 3.
9. The most frequent target has been the second assumption, which is sometimes called the Humean theory of motivation. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 52 (1978): 13-29; Darwall, Impartial Reason, chap. 5; Rachel Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" Ethics 96 (1986): 545-56. For arguments defending this assumption, see Michael Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation," Mind 96 (1987): 36-61; and Alfred Mele, "Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning," Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-36. Arguments against the first assumption are rare, although some philosophers have argued against a related assumption applied to moral requirements rather than reasons for acting. See, e.g., William Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," in Essays on Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 40-81; and David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 3.
10. The most frequent target has been the second assumption, which is sometimes called the Humean theory of motivation. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 52 (1978): 13-29; Darwall, Impartial Reason, chap. 5; Rachel Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" Ethics 96 (1986): 545-56. For arguments defending this assumption, see Michael Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation," Mind 96 (1987): 36-61; and Alfred Mele, "Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning," Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-36. Arguments against the first assumption are rare, although some philosophers have argued against a related assumption applied to moral requirements rather than reasons for acting. See, e.g., William Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," in Essays on Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 40-81; and David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 3.
11. The most frequent target has been the second assumption, which is sometimes called the Humean theory of motivation. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 52 (1978): 13-29; Darwall, Impartial Reason, chap. 5; Rachel Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" Ethics 96 (1986): 545-56. For arguments defending this assumption, see Michael Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation," Mind 96 (1987): 36-61; and Alfred Mele, "Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning," Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-36. Arguments against the first assumption are rare, although some philosophers have argued against a related assumption applied to moral requirements rather than reasons for acting. See, e.g., William Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," in Essays on Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 40-81; and David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 3.
12. The most frequent target has been the second assumption, which is sometimes called the Humean theory of motivation. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 52 (1978): 13-29; Darwall, Impartial Reason, chap. 5; Rachel Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" Ethics 96 (1986): 545-56. For arguments defending this assumption, see Michael Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation," Mind 96 (1987): 36-61; and Alfred Mele, "Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning," Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-36. Arguments against the first assumption are rare, although some philosophers have argued against a related assumption applied to moral requirements rather than reasons for acting. See, e.g., William Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," in Essays on Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 40-81; and David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 3.
13. The most frequent target has been the second assumption, which is sometimes called the Humean theory of motivation. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 52 (1978): 13-29; Darwall, Impartial Reason, chap. 5; Rachel Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" Ethics 96 (1986): 545-56. For arguments defending this assumption, see Michael Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation," Mind 96 (1987): 36-61; and Alfred Mele, "Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning," Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-36. Arguments against the first assumption are rare, although some philosophers have argued against a related assumption applied to moral requirements rather than reasons for acting. See, e.g., William Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," in Essays on Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 40-81; and David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 3.
14. The most frequent target has been the second assumption, which is sometimes called the Humean theory of motivation. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. ser., 52 (1978): 13-29; Darwall, Impartial Reason, chap. 5; Rachel Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" Ethics 96 (1986): 545-56. For arguments defending this assumption, see Michael Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation," Mind 96 (1987): 36-61; and Alfred Mele, "Motivational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning," Philosophia 19 (1989): 417-36. Arguments against the first assumption are rare, although some philosophers have argued against a related assumption applied to moral requirements rather than reasons for acting. See, e.g., William Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," in Essays on Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 40-81; and David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 3.
15. See Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 5-25.
16. Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 101-13; "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," in Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 35-45; "Replies," in World, Mind, and Ethics; Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 185-224.
17. Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 101-13; "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," in Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 35-45; "Replies," in World, Mind, and Ethics; Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 185-224.
18. Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 101-13; "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," in Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 35-45; "Replies," in World, Mind, and Ethics; Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 185-224.
19. Here I am choosing one of two possible readings that have occasioned considerable confusion in the literature. The confusion can be traced to the casual manner in which Williams introduces the term 'internal reason'. Williams carefully defines what he calls the "internal interpretation" of the statement "A has reason to φ." Interpreted internally, the statement implies that A has some motive that can be served by his φ-ing. Williams then says "I shall also for convenience refer sometimes to 'internal reasons' and 'external reasons'" ("Internal and External Reasons," p. 101). But Williams never explains how a scheme for interpreting reason-attributions can be transformed into a scheme for classifying reasons themselves. Two different schemes of classification have suggested themselves to philosophers writing in this area. One scheme classifies as internal any reason that can engage one of the agent's motives so as to sway him toward doing that for which it is a reason. The other scheme classifies as internal only those reasons whose status as reasons depends on their capacity to engage the agent's motives in this way. An internal reason, on this latter scheme, is one that wouldn't be a reason if the agent didn't have a motive that it could engage. The difference between these schemes of classification can be illustrated by the case of an agent who has both a reason and a corresponding motive. According to the first scheme, this reason is definitely internal, since the agent has a motive corresponding to it. According to the second scheme, however, this reason could still be external, if it would remain a reason for the agent whether or not he had the motive. Only the latter scheme captures the entailment that distinguishes Williams's "internal interpretation" of reason-attributions. For on the former scheme, the agent's having a reason doesn't require him to have a motive. If he lacks a corresponding motive, then his reason doesn't necessarily cease to be a reason, on this scheme; it simply ceases to be internal. Yet under the internal interpretation of reason-attributions, the agent must have the motive in order for it to be true that he has a reason at all. I therefore prefer the latter scheme of classification.
20. Note that this usage differs somewhat from that of other philosophers, for whom the term 'internalism' refers to our first premise, requiring reasons to have the capacity of exerting an influence.
21. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason." For other discussions of Williams, see Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" and Rachel Cohon, "Internalism about Reasons for Action," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993): 265-88; Martin Hollis, The Cunning of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 6; Brad Hooker, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Analysis 47 (1987): 42-44; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in Altham and Harrison, eds., pp. 68-85; Elijah Millgram, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Nous 30 (1996): 197-220.
22. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason." For other discussions of Williams, see Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" and Rachel Cohon, "Internalism about Reasons for Action," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993): 265-88; Martin Hollis, The Cunning of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 6; Brad Hooker, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Analysis 47 (1987): 42-44; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in Altham and Harrison, eds., pp. 68-85; Elijah Millgram, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Nous 30 (1996): 197-220.
23. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason." For other discussions of Williams, see Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" and Rachel Cohon, "Internalism about Reasons for Action," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993): 265-88; Martin Hollis, The Cunning of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 6; Brad Hooker, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Analysis 47 (1987): 42-44; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in Altham and Harrison, eds., pp. 68-85; Elijah Millgram, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Nous 30 (1996): 197-220.
24. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason." For other discussions of Williams, see Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" and Rachel Cohon, "Internalism about Reasons for Action," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993): 265-88; Martin Hollis, The Cunning of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 6; Brad Hooker, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Analysis 47 (1987): 42-44; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in Altham and Harrison, eds., pp. 68-85; Elijah Millgram, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Nous 30 (1996): 197-220.
25. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason." For other discussions of Williams, see Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" and Rachel Cohon, "Internalism about Reasons for Action," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993): 265-88; Martin Hollis, The Cunning of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 6; Brad Hooker, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Analysis 47 (1987): 42-44; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in Altham and Harrison, eds., pp. 68-85; Elijah Millgram, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Nous 30 (1996): 197-220.
26. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason." For other discussions of Williams, see Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" and Rachel Cohon, "Internalism about Reasons for Action," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993): 265-88; Martin Hollis, The Cunning of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 6; Brad Hooker, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Analysis 47 (1987): 42-44; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in Altham and Harrison, eds., pp. 68-85; Elijah Millgram, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Nous 30 (1996): 197-220.
27. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason." For other discussions of Williams, see Cohon, "Are External Reasons Impossible?" and Rachel Cohon, "Internalism about Reasons for Action," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993): 265-88; Martin Hollis, The Cunning of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chap. 6; Brad Hooker, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Analysis 47 (1987): 42-44; John McDowell, "Might There Be External Reasons?" in Altham and Harrison, eds., pp. 68-85; Elijah Millgram, "Williams' Argument against External Reasons," Nous 30 (1996): 197-220.
28. See also Michael Smith, "Reason and Desire," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1988): 243-58. Smith seems to think (pp. 248-52) that he and Korsgaard disagree, but I think that they don't. In particular, Smith believes that Korsgaard rejects the second premise, that considerations can influence an agent only in conjunction with his conative attitudes. But I don't interpret Korsgaard as rejecting this premise. Korsgaard never claims that a consideration, or belief, can move an agent without the help of a conation or motive; what she claims, I think, is that the desires and values mediating the influence of a consideration need not be ordinary motives, of the sort that are directed at the agent's ends, since they can instead constitute his virtue of rationality. Williams responds to this argument but seerns to misunderstand it. He seems to think that if all rational agents have, say, a motive for doing what's right, then the fact that an action is right will turn out to be an internal reason for them, after all: "If this is so, then the constraints of morality are part of everybody's [motivational set], and every correct moral reason will be an internal reason" ("Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," p. 37). But here Williams adopts a sense of the phrase 'internal reason' that fails to capture his own "internal interpretation" of reason-attributions, as I have explained in n. 9, above. In this sense, an internal reason is one with the capacity to engage an agent's motives, but not necessarily one whose very status as a reason depends upon that capacity. I believe that Korsgaard is working with the alternative (and, to my mind, preferable) sense of 'internal reason', according to which an internal reason is one whose status as a reason depends on its capacity to engage the agent's motives. And what Korsgaard envisions is that reasons for behaving morally will qualify as reasons whether or not people have motives that such reasons can engage. Even if people happen to have the relevant motives, reasons for behaving morally will still be independent of them, in Korsgaard's view, and such reasons should be classified as external. For a misinterpretation similar to Williams's, see John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 85, n. 33.
29. See also Michael Smith, "Reason and Desire," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1988): 243-58. Smith seems to think (pp. 248-52) that he and Korsgaard disagree, but I think that they don't. In particular, Smith believes that Korsgaard rejects the second premise, that considerations can influence an agent only in conjunction with his conative attitudes. But I don't interpret Korsgaard as rejecting this premise. Korsgaard never claims that a consideration, or belief, can move an agent without the help of a conation or motive; what she claims, I think, is that the desires and values mediating the influence of a consideration need not be ordinary motives, of the sort that are directed at the agent's ends, since they can instead constitute his virtue of rationality. Williams responds to this argument but seerns to misunderstand it. He seems to think that if all rational agents have, say, a motive for doing what's right, then the fact that an action is right will turn out to be an internal reason for them, after all: "If this is so, then the constraints of morality are part of everybody's [motivational set], and every correct moral reason will be an internal reason" ("Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," p. 37). But here Williams adopts a sense of the phrase 'internal reason' that fails to capture his own "internal interpretation" of reason-attributions, as I have explained in n. 9, above. In this sense, an internal reason is one with the capacity to engage an agent's motives, but not necessarily one whose very status as a reason depends upon that capacity. I believe that Korsgaard is working with the alternative (and, to my mind, preferable) sense of 'internal reason', according to which an internal reason is one whose status as a reason depends on its capacity to engage the agent's motives. And what Korsgaard envisions is that reasons for behaving morally will qualify as reasons whether or not people have motives that such reasons can engage. Even if people happen to have the relevant motives, reasons for behaving morally will still be independent of them, in Korsgaard's view, and such reasons should be classified as external. For a misinterpretation similar to Williams's, see John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 85, n. 33.
30. I do not mean that Korsgaard would call herself an externalist, since she uses the term in a somewhat different sense. See n. 10 above.
31. I don't mean to claim that Korsgaard holds this version of externalism. Korsgaard's "Skepticism about Practical Reason" seems designed to be independent, in many respects, of her larger metaethical project. It therefore leaves open various versions of externalism that Korsgaard herself would not necessarily endorse. Indeed, I suspect that the version of externalism discussed here in the text corresponds to what Korsgaard rejects under the label "dogmatic rationalism" in "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," in Value and Practical Reason, ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press).
32. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," p. 18.
33. Ibid., p. 22.
34. Williams, "Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," p. 37.
35. Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason," p. 22.
36. I believe that Korsgaard proposes this very strategy ("Skepticism about Practical Reason," pp. 30-31). And I believe that there may be a way - a distinctively Kantian way - of making the strategy work. I discuss this Kantian version of the strategy briefly in n. 25, below. Note, then, that the present argument does not purport to prove that the strategy in question is unworkable. It's meant to justify doubts about the strategy, by showing just how difficult it will be to carry out.
37. I suspect that the argument offered in this section is related to the argument offered by Williams on pp. 109-10 of "Internal and External Reasons." Because I don't fully understand the relevant passage, however, I hesitate to attribute the argument to Williams.
38. The distinction between the formal and substantive aims of practical reason is discussed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), pp. 3, 9, 37. As David Gauthier has pointed out ("Rationality and the Rational Aim," in Reading Parfit, ed. Jonathan Dancy [in press]), Parfit is less than clear on the relation between these aims; in particular, Parfit doesn't appear to believe that the substantive aim of practical reason, as identified by a particular theory, is a specification of the formal aim. Like Gauthier, I prefer to use the phrase 'substantive aim' for that which specifies what it is to achieve the formal aim.
39. The distinction between the formal and substantive aims of practical reason is discussed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), pp. 3, 9, 37. As David Gauthier has pointed out ("Rationality and the Rational Aim," in Reading Parfit, ed. Jonathan Dancy [in press]), Parfit is less than clear on the relation between these aims; in particular, Parfit doesn't appear to believe that the substantive aim of practical reason, as identified by a particular theory, is a specification of the formal aim. Like Gauthier, I prefer to use the phrase 'substantive aim' for that which specifies what it is to achieve the formal aim.
40. This notion is, for example, the basis of Donald Davidson's conception of practical reasoning. See his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980). The problems mentioned here are discussed further in the text accompanying n. 45 below.
41. Of course, we could introduce a substantive conception of competent practical reasoning - a substantively specified procedure, adherence to which constitutes good reasoning. In that case, however, the definition of rational action as that which would issue from competent practical reasoning will become a substantive concept, which once again requires justification.
42. The notion that practical reasoning is framed by a criterion of success for actions is discussed by David Gauthier in "Assure and Threaten," Ethics 104 (1994): 690-721. discuss Gauthier's treatment of this notion in my "Deciding How to Decide," in Cullity and Gaut, eds.
43. The notion that practical reasoning is framed by a criterion of success for actions is discussed by David Gauthier in "Assure and Threaten," Ethics 104 (1994): 690-721. discuss Gauthier's treatment of this notion in my "Deciding How to Decide," in Cullity and Gaut, eds.
44. Kant's conception of practical reason, as I understand it, is an attempt to circumvent this problem, by using the concept of a reason, not to identify which features are reasons, but rather to identify which features aren't, and by replacing the rule of acting for reasons with a rule of not acting for nonreasons. On Kant's conception, as I understand it, the object of practical reasoning is to act on any consideration but one whose being a reason would entail a contradiction. It's like a hunt whose object is to locate anything but that which could not possibly be a quarry. Perhaps the generic concepts of a quarry or a reason can indeed serve this modest role.
45. I don't mean to imply that internalism avoids all normative commitments. In "Skepticism about Practical Reason," Korsgaard suggests that the instrumental principle of adopting the means to one's ends is a substantive norm; she defends this point at length in "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason." But even if internalism has to justify requiring us to care about the means to what we already care about, it avoids the further and heavier burden of justifying any requirements to care about particular things.
46. The analogy between theoretical and practical reason is being pursued independently by my colleague Peter Railton, with somewhat different results. See his "What the Noncognitivist Helps Us to See the Naturalist Must Help Us to Explain," in Reality, Representation, and Projection, ed. John Haldane and Crispin Wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 279-300, pp. 292 ff.; "A Kind of Nonsubjective Reason?" in Essays in Honor of Kurt Baier, ed. J. Schneewind (New York: Open Court, in press); and "On the Hypothetical and Non-hypothetical in Reasoning about Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds. David Gauthier also discusses the analogy, but he ultimately rejects it ("Assure and Threaten," pp. 699-702).
47. The analogy between theoretical and practical reason is being pursued independently by my colleague Peter Railton, with somewhat different results. See his "What the Noncognitivist Helps Us to See the Naturalist Must Help Us to Explain," in Reality, Representation, and Projection, ed. John Haldane and Crispin Wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 279-300, pp. 292 ff.; "A Kind of Nonsubjective Reason?" in Essays in Honor of Kurt Baier, ed. J. Schneewind (New York: Open Court, in press); and "On the Hypothetical and Non-hypothetical in Reasoning about Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds. David Gauthier also discusses the analogy, but he ultimately rejects it ("Assure and Threaten," pp. 699-702).
48. The analogy between theoretical and practical reason is being pursued independently by my colleague Peter Railton, with somewhat different results. See his "What the Noncognitivist Helps Us to See the Naturalist Must Help Us to Explain," in Reality, Representation, and Projection, ed. John Haldane and Crispin Wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 279-300, pp. 292 ff.; "A Kind of Nonsubjective Reason?" in Essays in Honor of Kurt Baier, ed. J. Schneewind (New York: Open Court, in press); and "On the Hypothetical and Non-hypothetical in Reasoning about Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds. David Gauthier also discusses the analogy, but he ultimately rejects it ("Assure and Threaten," pp. 699-702).
49. The analogy between theoretical and practical reason is being pursued independently by my colleague Peter Railton, with somewhat different results. See his "What the Noncognitivist Helps Us to See the Naturalist Must Help Us to Explain," in Reality, Representation, and Projection, ed. John Haldane and Crispin Wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 279-300, pp. 292 ff.; "A Kind of Nonsubjective Reason?" in Essays in Honor of Kurt Baier, ed. J. Schneewind (New York: Open Court, in press); and "On the Hypothetical and Non-hypothetical in Reasoning about Action," in Cullity and Gaut, eds. David Gauthier also discusses the analogy, but he ultimately rejects it ("Assure and Threaten," pp. 699-702).
50. Some may be inclined to think that the object of theoretical reasoning is not true belief but empirically adequate and explanatorily fruitful belief, or belief of some other kind. My argument doesn't depend on the outcome of this disagreement. What matters for my purposes is that theoretical reasoning aims at some outcome specified substantively (i.e., not in terms of its being the object of theoretical reasoning or belief).
51. The claim that truth isn't defined in terms of success in theoretical reasoning is potentially controversial. It must be rejected by those who hold a pragmatist conception of truth as the eventual deliverance of rational inquiry. In my view, however, the pragmatist conception renders theoretical reasoning vacuous, like a game whose only object is winning.
52. In the case of inductive reasoning, of course, we may have trouble saying what relevance reasons have to the truth of a belief. Nevertheless, such reasons count as reasons for a belief because they make it seem true, even if we cannot say how or why. (An alternative way of handling this case would be to point out that inductive reasons satisfy a substantive procedural criterion of correctness in inductive inference. See n. 23 above.)
53. Williams raises this question and seems to suggest that the absence of an inclination toward the truth would undermine the existence of reasons for belief ("Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame," p. 37). This is, of course, the internalist answer to the question.
54. I believe that Korsgaard makes a similar point ("The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," p. 42). In passages such as this, where Korsgaard seems to be pursuing a strategy like the one I am developing here, I begin to doubt whether she really is an externalist, in Williams's sense of the term. My reasons for this doubt will be explained in the text, below, when I explain why I do not regard the present strategy as a version of externalism.
55. Bernard Williams, "Deciding to Believe," in Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 136-51.
56. This difference between belief and desire can be obscured by the fact that desiring that P entails desiring P to be true, just as believing that P entails believing it to be true. These locutions obscure the difference between belief and desire because they use the infinitive 'to be', which is required for indirect discourse, to replace what would be different moods of the copula in direct speech. In believing P to be true, one believes in its completed truth, as would be expressed by the indicative statement that P is true; whereas in desiring P to be true, one desires its to-be-completed truth, as would be expressed by the optative that it be true. Thus, although we can speak either of believing or of desiring P to be true, transposing these statements from oratio obliqua to oratio recta reveals an underlying difference in the relation that P is taken as bearing to the world.
57. The language used in this contrast should not be overinterpreted. To say that belief involves regarding a proposition as true, or that desire involves regarding it as to be made true, is simply to articulate our concepts of belief and desire as prepositional attitudes. We express the fundamental similarity among these content-bearing mental states by describing them as ways of regarding propositional contents, and we express the differences among them by differentiating among the ways in which those contents can be regarded. The resulting locutions should not be understood as positing any particular mental architecture, least of all an inner eye that squints at propositions or raises its eyebrow at them so as to regard them in different ways. Rather, these locutions simply translate our terms for propositional attitudes into a common vocabulary, in which their similarities and differences can be clearly expressed. To say that belief entails regarding a proposition as true is therefore not to commit ourselves to any particular theory about which physical, neurological, or otherwise subdoxastic states make up the mental state of belief. It commits us only to a view about what such states must amount to if they are to constitute belief - namely, that they must amount to the state of regarding a proposition as true. For recent discussions of this phenomenon, commonly called "direction of fit," see Lloyd Humberstone, "Direction of Fit," Mind 101 (1992): 59-83; and G. F. Schueler, "Pro-attitudes and Direction of Fit," Mind 100 (1991): 277-81. Note that I understand direction of fit somewhat differently from these and other authors. For a fuller treatment of the differences, see my "The Guise of the Good," Nous 26 (1992): 3-26; and n. 55 below.
58. The language used in this contrast should not be overinterpreted. To say that belief involves regarding a proposition as true, or that desire involves regarding it as to be made true, is simply to articulate our concepts of belief and desire as prepositional attitudes. We express the fundamental similarity among these content-bearing mental states by describing them as ways of regarding propositional contents, and we express the differences among them by differentiating among the ways in which those contents can be regarded. The resulting locutions should not be understood as positing any particular mental architecture, least of all an inner eye that squints at propositions or raises its eyebrow at them so as to regard them in different ways. Rather, these locutions simply translate our terms for propositional attitudes into a common vocabulary, in which their similarities and differences can be clearly expressed. To say that belief entails regarding a proposition as true is therefore not to commit ourselves to any particular theory about which physical, neurological, or otherwise subdoxastic states make up the mental state of belief. It commits us only to a view about what such states must amount to if they are to constitute belief - namely, that they must amount to the state of regarding a proposition as true. For recent discussions of this phenomenon, commonly called "direction of fit," see Lloyd Humberstone, "Direction of Fit," Mind 101 (1992): 59-83; and G. F. Schueler, "Pro-attitudes and Direction of Fit," Mind 100 (1991): 277-81. Note that I understand direction of fit somewhat differently from these and other authors. For a fuller treatment of the differences, see my "The Guise of the Good," Nous 26 (1992): 3-26; and n. 55 below.
59. The language used in this contrast should not be overinterpreted. To say that belief involves regarding a proposition as true, or that desire involves regarding it as to be made true, is simply to articulate our concepts of belief and desire as prepositional attitudes. We express the fundamental similarity among these content-bearing mental states by describing them as ways of regarding propositional contents, and we express the differences among them by differentiating among the ways in which those contents can be regarded. The resulting locutions should not be understood as positing any particular mental architecture, least of all an inner eye that squints at propositions or raises its eyebrow at them so as to regard them in different ways. Rather, these locutions simply translate our terms for propositional attitudes into a common vocabulary, in which their similarities and differences can be clearly expressed. To say that belief entails regarding a proposition as true is therefore not to commit ourselves to any particular theory about which physical, neurological, or otherwise subdoxastic states make up the mental state of belief. It commits us only to a view about what such states must amount to if they are to constitute belief - namely, that they must amount to the state of regarding a proposition as true. For recent discussions of this phenomenon, commonly called "direction of fit," see Lloyd Humberstone, "Direction of Fit," Mind 101 (1992): 59-83; and G. F. Schueler, "Pro-attitudes and Direction of Fit," Mind 100 (1991): 277-81. Note that I understand direction of fit somewhat differently from these and other authors. For a fuller treatment of the differences, see my "The Guise of the Good," Nous 26 (1992): 3-26; and n. 55 below.
60. For related discussions of the similarities and differences among these cognitive states, see Jennifer Church, "Judgment, Self-Consciousness, and Object Independence," American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1990): 51-60; and Mark Leon, "Rationalising Belief," Philosophical Papers 21 (1992): 299-314.
61. For related discussions of the similarities and differences among these cognitive states, see Jennifer Church, "Judgment, Self-Consciousness, and Object Independence," American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1990): 51-60; and Mark Leon, "Rationalising Belief," Philosophical Papers 21 (1992): 299-314.
62. An example that can help to illustrate this conception of the propositional attitudes appears in Bernard Williams's discussion of "Imagination and the Self" (in Problems of the Self, pp. 29-31). Williams compares two men who imagine assassinating the Prime Minister in the person of Lord Salisbury. One man imagines assassinating the Prime Minister but falsely believes that Lord Salisbury occupies that position; the other man, who knows that Lord Salisbury isn't Prime Minister, nevertheless imagines him to be, while also imagining a similar assassination. "On the purely psychological level," Williams remarks, "the same visualisings, the same images, could surely occur in both cases. The difference lies rather in how the story is meant" (p. 31). According to my account, "how the story is meant" should be understood in terms of the aim with which it is regarded as true that Lord Salisbury is Prime Minister. Each subject includes this identification in his "story," and thereby regards it as true. But one subject regards it as true for the sake of correctly identifying the Prime Minister, whereas the other regards it as true for the sake of his own entertainment.
63. The point will be lost on those who believe that any goal-directed movement, mental or physical, automatically qualifies as an intentional action. I reject this view, as will become clear on pp. 715 ff. My reasons for rejecting it are developed more fully in my "Guise of the Good" and "What Happens When Someone Acts?" Mind 101 (1992): 461-81. In any case, the present account of belief will be misunderstood if aims are assumed to be necessarily agential.
64. As David Phillips has pointed out to me, the mechanisms whose function is to track the truth may employ assumptions or even fantasies along the way. Thus, whether a particular instance of acceptance is an hypothesis, fantasy, or belief cannot depend on the ultimate aim toward which it is directed. Rather, the nature of each acceptance must depend on its immediate aim, as I have tried to indicate with the words 'therein' and 'thereby': to assume that P is to accept P for the sake of thereby formulating a possibility to be tested, whereas to believe that P is to accept P for the sake of thereby accepting the truth with respect to P. (Peter Railton raises the same problem in his "Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief," Philosophical Issues 5 [1994]: 71-93.)
65. As Williams noted in "Deciding to Believe," this account of indifference to the truth of a belief explains the difficulty of acting on that indifference. In order to end up believing the proposition that I want to believe, I must accept it in the course of an attempt to accept what is true, not an attempt merely to accept this proposition. Indifference to the truth must not seep into my first-order attempt from my second-order attitude toward its success or failure. Some psychological partitioning is therefore necessary. On the difficulty of manipulating beliefs, see also Leon.
66. Of course, reasons for belief are also relative to an informational context, and insofar as different people are in possession of different information, they will be subject to different reasons. But if the informational context is held constant, the relativity of reasons to persons disappears.
67. See, e.g., Jay Wallace, "How to Argue about Practical Reason," Mind 99 (1990): 355-85, p. 359: "To act intentionally ... is necessarily to be in a goal-directed state"; see also Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation."
68. See, e.g., Jay Wallace, "How to Argue about Practical Reason," Mind 99 (1990): 355-85, p. 359: "To act intentionally ... is necessarily to be in a goal-directed state"; see also Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation."
69. The idea that some actions spring out of motives without being directed toward any ends or goals is defended by Michael Stocker, "Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 747-65.
70. This view is echoed by Donald Davidson in "How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?" in Essays on Actions and Events, pp. 21-42, p. 22.
71. This problem was foreshadowed in the text accompanying n. 22, above.
72. In adopting an evil end, the perverse agent may of course be said to make evil his good, as Satan does in Paradise Lost (bk. 4, line 110). But Satan makes evil his good only in the formal sense that its attainment will be the criterion of his success. The fact that even Satan's actions aim at the good in this formal sense doesn't help us to identify a substantive aim that constitutes them as actions. G. E. M. Anscombe discusses this passage (Intention [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963], p. 75), and I have elsewhere criticized her discussion ("Guise of the Good," pp. 18 ff.).
73. I do not mean that every part or aspect of the behavior must come under your conscious control in order for the behavior to constitute a full-blooded action. How you execute the catch may still be left to those reflexes which make up your skill as a catcher; that you execute a catch, however, must come under your control, or the catch won't be an action in the fullest sense.
74. I have elsewhere presented an independent argument for this thesis ("What Happens When Someone Acts?"). The idea that practical reason has motives of its own, directed at the control of one's behavior, is contained in the theory of motivation attributed to Plato by John Cooper, "Plato's Theory of Human Motivation," History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1984): 3-21.
75. Bernard Williams has pointed out to me that one can consciously control one's behavior while aiming not to - as, for example, when one unsuccessfully tries to let one's reflexes or instincts take over. But this point strikes me as compatible with my claim that one cannot consciously control one's behavior without aiming to. Trying not to control one's behavior involves a second-order goal, of relaxing one's first-order efforts at control. If one continues to control one's behavior while trying not to, the reason is that one continues to aim at controlling it while trying not to persist in that aim. (Remember that the aims under discussion here may be subagential. See pp. 716-17, above).
76. Thanks to Chris Korsgaard for publicly daring me to express this thought.
77. Stephen Darwall has proposed a similar conception of reasons, under the name 'autonomist internalism' ("Autonomist Internalism and the Justification of Morals," Nous 24 [1990]: 257-68). Of course, considerations may be relevant to our autonomy because of their relevance to our interests. The point is that their relevance to autonomy will be what makes them reasons for acting.
78. See my Practical Reflection (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); and "The Story of Rational Action," Philosophical Topics 21 (1993): 229-54.
79. See my Practical Reflection (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); and "The Story of Rational Action," Philosophical Topics 21 (1993): 229-54.
80. See Anscombe, Intention; Stuart Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), chap. 3; Brian O'Shaughnessy, The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), chap. 8. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), sees. 627 ff.
81. See Anscombe, Intention; Stuart Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), chap. 3; Brian O'Shaughnessy, The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), chap. 8. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), sees. 627 ff.
82. See Anscombe, Intention; Stuart Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), chap. 3; Brian O'Shaughnessy, The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), chap. 8. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), sees. 627 ff.
83. See Anscombe, Intention; Stuart Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), chap. 3; Brian O'Shaughnessy, The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), chap. 8. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), sees. 627 ff.
84. Compare the ancient and medieval notion of "practical knowledge," which is "the cause of what it understands" (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, Q3, art. 5, obj. 1). Anscombe discusses this notion in the last two paragraphs of her paper "Thought and Action in Aristotle" (in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. by R. Bambrough [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965], 143-58), thereby picking up a theme that was left undeveloped in Intention, pp. 1-5, 56-58, 87. See also David Pears, Motivated Irrationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), chap. 8; and Arthur Danto, "Action, Knowledge, and Representation," in Action Theory, ed. by Myles Brand and Douglas Walton (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976), pp. 11-25.
85. Compare the ancient and medieval notion of "practical knowledge," which is "the cause of what it understands" (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, Q3, art. 5, obj. 1). Anscombe discusses this notion in the last two paragraphs of her paper "Thought and Action in Aristotle" (in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. by R. Bambrough [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965], 143-58), thereby picking up a theme that was left undeveloped in Intention, pp. 1-5, 56-58, 87. See also David Pears, Motivated Irrationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), chap. 8; and Arthur Danto, "Action, Knowledge, and Representation," in Action Theory, ed. by Myles Brand and Douglas Walton (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976), pp. 11-25.
86. Compare the ancient and medieval notion of "practical knowledge," which is "the cause of what it understands" (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, Q3, art. 5, obj. 1). Anscombe discusses this notion in the last two paragraphs of her paper "Thought and Action in Aristotle" (in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. by R. Bambrough [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965], 143-58), thereby picking up a theme that was left undeveloped in Intention, pp. 1-5, 56-58, 87. See also David Pears, Motivated Irrationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), chap. 8; and Arthur Danto, "Action, Knowledge, and Representation," in Action Theory, ed. by Myles Brand and Douglas Walton (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976), pp. 11-25.
87. Compare the ancient and medieval notion of "practical knowledge," which is "the cause of what it understands" (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, Q3, art. 5, obj. 1). Anscombe discusses this notion in the last two paragraphs of her paper "Thought and Action in Aristotle" (in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. by R. Bambrough [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965], 143-58), thereby picking up a theme that was left undeveloped in Intention, pp. 1-5, 56-58, 87. See also David Pears, Motivated Irrationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), chap. 8; and Arthur Danto, "Action, Knowledge, and Representation," in Action Theory, ed. by Myles Brand and Douglas Walton (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976), pp. 11-25.
88. Compare the ancient and medieval notion of "practical knowledge," which is "the cause of what it understands" (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, Q3, art. 5, obj. 1). Anscombe discusses this notion in the last two paragraphs of her paper "Thought and Action in Aristotle" (in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. by R. Bambrough [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965], 143-58), thereby picking up a theme that was left undeveloped in Intention, pp. 1-5, 56-58, 87. See also David Pears, Motivated Irrationality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), chap. 8; and Arthur Danto, "Action, Knowledge, and Representation," in Action Theory, ed. by Myles Brand and Douglas Walton (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976), pp. 11-25.
89. Here I am expanding on two themes that I have discussed elsewhere. First, I am expanding an earlier critique of the traditional notion of direction of fit (in my "Guise of the Good"). In my view, this notion conflates two different distinctions. One is the distinction between the cognitive and the conative - the distinction between accepting, or regarding as true and approving, or regarding as to be made true. The other is a distinction between the receptive and the directive, which are two different ways of attempting to accept what's true - namely, by accepting so as to reflect the truth, and by accepting so as to create the truth. If these distinctions are conflated under the heading 'direction of fit', then one and the same mental state can appear to have two different directions of fit, since a subject can attempt to accept what's true by accepting something so as to make it true. The resulting state is cognitive rather than conative, but directive rather than receptive: it's directive cognition. I would claim that this state of directive cognition is the state of intending to act. This is the second theme on which I am currently expanding. In the past, I have said that an intention is a self-fulfilling and self-referring belief (Practical Reflection, chap. 4; see also "How to Share an Intention," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 [1997]). The present discussion explains why I call it a belief, but also why I can dispense with that label. What matters is that intention is a state of directive cognition, not whether that state should be called belief.
90. Here I am expanding on two themes that I have discussed elsewhere. First, I am expanding an earlier critique of the traditional notion of direction of fit (in my "Guise of the Good"). In my view, this notion conflates two different distinctions. One is the distinction between the cognitive and the conative - the distinction between accepting, or regarding as true and approving, or regarding as to be made true. The other is a distinction between the receptive and the directive, which are two different ways of attempting to accept what's true - namely, by accepting so as to reflect the truth, and by accepting so as to create the truth. If these distinctions are conflated under the heading 'direction of fit', then one and the same mental state can appear to have two different directions of fit, since a subject can attempt to accept what's true by accepting something so as to make it true. The resulting state is cognitive rather than conative, but directive rather than receptive: it's directive cognition. I would claim that this state of directive cognition is the state of intending to act. This is the second theme on which I am currently
91. See Davidson, "Intending," in Essays an Actions and Events, pp. 83-102, p. 86. Because Davidson thinks that this premise should express your desire, he would reformulate it, from "I want to save that glass" to "Saving that glass would be desirable."
92. Davidson, "How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?" p. 32; and "Intending," pp. 98-99.
93. Davidson, "How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?" p. 32; and "Intending," pp. 98-99.
94. This quarrel is a continuation of my "Guise of the Good" and "What Happens When Someone Acts?"
95. Note that in my account, your autonomy isn't an ability to control the motions of your hand; it's an ability to control your behavior, which is bodily motion psychologically understood, in terms of its motivation. Even a robot can control whether its hand moves. It takes an autonomous agent to control whether he moves his hand out of a desire to save a glass. The object of autonomous control is thus the entire behavior, comprising motivation as well as movement. The same point can be put in (somewhat) Kantian terms, as follows. Acting autonomously isn't just moving in accordance with one's idea of a movement; it's acting in accordance with one's idea of a law - in this case, the law of motivation.