Moral Realism: A Defence

Moral Realism: A Defence

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-332

  Shafer Landau, Russ ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Externalism about reasons; Metaethics; Moral disagreement; Moral epistemology; Moral facts; Moral motivation; Moral rationalism; Moral realism; Moral reasons; Motivational internalism; Non naturalism; Reliabilism; Self evidence self evident; Supervenience

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921979528     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199259755.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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