Slaves of the Passions

Slaves of the Passions

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-224

  Schroeder, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Agent neutrality; Explanation; Humean theory of reasons; Morality; Objectivity; Practical reason; Reasons; Reduction

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922053787     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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