Moral Skepticisms

Moral Skepticisms

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 1-288

  Sinnott Armstrong, Walter ^a  

^a DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Contextualism; Contrastivism; Justified moral belief; Moral epistemology; Moral knowledge; Moral Skepticism; Naturalism; Normativism; Pyrrhonian skepticism; Pyrrhonism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921385773     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0195187725.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (285)

1. Achinstein, Peter. 2001. The Book of Evidence. New York: Oxford University Press.
2. Allen, Amy. Forthcoming. "Discourse Ethics versus Moral Skepticism: The Foucault/Habermas Debate Reconsidered."
3. Annis, David B. 1978. "A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification." American Philosophical Quarterly 15:213-19.
4. Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy 33:1-19.
5. Audi, Robert. 1993. The Structure of Justification. New York: Cambridge University Press.
6. Audi, Robert. 1996. "Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics." In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons: 101-36. New York: Oxford University Press.
7. Audi, Robert. 1998. Epistemology. London: Routledge.
8. Audi, Robert. 2002. "An Internalist Theory of Normative Grounds." Philosophical Topics 30:19-46.
9. Audi, Robert. 2004. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
10. Austin, J. L. 1961. "A Plea for Excuses." In Philosophical Papers. New York: Oxford University Press.
11. Ayer, A. J. 1946. Language, Truth, and Logic. 2nd edition. London: Gollantz. 1st edition published 1935.
12. Baron, Jonathan. 1994. "Nonconsequentialist Decisions." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17:1-42 (including comments and response).
13. Baron, Marcia. 2002. "Character, Immorality, and Punishment." In Rationality, Rules, and Ideals, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert Audi:243-58. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
14. Bellah, R. N., Madson, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swindler, A., and Tipton, S. M. 1985. Habits of the Heart. New York: Harper and Row.
15. Beyleveld, Deryck. 1991. The Dialectical Necessity of Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
16. Bird, Alexander. 2001. "Scepticism and Contrast Classes." Analysis 61:97-107.
17. Blackburn, Simon. 1973. "Moral Realism." Reprinted in Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
18. Blackburn, Simon. 1984. Spreading the Word. New York: Oxford University Press.
19. Blackburn, Simon. 1985. "Supervenience Revisited." Reprinted in Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
20. Blackburn, Simon. 1988. "Attitudes and Contents." Reprinted in Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
21. Blackburn, Simon. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. New York: Oxford University Press.
22. Blackburn, Simon. 1996. "Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist." In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons: 82-100. New York: Oxford University Press.
23. Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
24. BonJour, Laurence. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
25. BonJour, Laurence. 2002. Epistemology. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
26. Boorse, Christopher, and Sorensen, Roy. 1988. "Ducking Harm." Journal of Philosophy 85:115-34.
27. Boyd, Richard. 1988. "How to Be a Moral Realist." In Essays on Moral Realism, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
28. Brandt, Richard. 1954. Hopi Ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
29. Brandt, Richard. 1979. A Theory of the Good and the Right. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
30. Brennan, Geoffrey, and Pettit, Philip. 2004. The Economy of Esteem. New York: Oxford University Press.
31. Brink, David. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
32. Burgess, J. A. 1998. "Error Theories and Values." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76(4):534-52.
33. Burgess, J. P. 1979. "Against Ethics." Unpublished manuscript, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University.
34. Chaiken, S. 1980. "Heuristic versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source versus Message Cues in Persuasion." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39:752-66.
35. Chisholm, Roderick M. 1982. "The Problem of the Criterion." In The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
36. Chisholm, Roderick M. 1989. Theory of Knowledge. 3rd edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
37. Clifford, W. K. 1879. "The Ethics of Belief." In Lectures and Essays. London: Macmillan.
38. Copp, David. 1990. "Explanation and Justification in Ethics." Ethics 100:237-58.
39. Copp, David. 1991. "Moral Skepticism," Philosophical Studies 62:203-33.
40. Copp, David. 1995. Morality, Normativity, and Society. New York: Oxford University Press.
41. Copp, David, and Zimmerman, David, eds. 1984. Morality, Reason, and Truth. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.
42. Craig, William Lane, and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2004. God? A Debate between a Christian and an Atheist. New York: Oxford University Press.
43. Dancy, Jonathan. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.
44. Dancy, Jonathan. 2004. Ethics without Principles. New York: Oxford University Press.
45. Daniels, Norman. 1979. "Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics." Journal of Philosophy 76:256-82.
46. Daniels, Norman. 1980. "Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedian Points." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10:83-103.
47. Davidson, Donald. 1967. "The Logical Form of Action Sentences." In The Logic of Decision and Action, ed. N. Rescher. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
48. Dawkins, Richard. 1976. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
49. DePaul, Michael, and Ramsey, W., eds. 1998. Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
50. DeRose, Keith. 1999. "Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense." In The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, ed. John Greco and Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Blackwell.
51. DeRose, Keith, and Warfield, Ted, eds. 1999. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. New York: Oxford University Press.
52. Descartes, René. 1641. Meditations.
53. DeVoto, Bernard. 1942. The Year of Decision: 1846. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
54. Doris, John. 2002. Lack of Character. New York: Cambridge.
55. Dorr, Cian. 2002. "Non-Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking." Nous 33:558-72.
56. Dreier, James. 1996. "Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth." Philosophical Studies 83:29-51.
57. Dretske, Fred. 1970. "Epistemic Operators." Journal of Philosophy 67:1007-23.
58. Dworkin, Ronald. 1996. "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It." Philosophy and Public Affairs 25:87-139.
59. Fogelin, Robert. 1967. Evidence and Meaning. New York: Routledge.
60. Fogelin, Robert. 1994. Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. New York: Oxford University Press.
61. Fogelin, Robert, and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2005. Understanding Arguments. 7th edition. Belmont, CA.: Thomson/Wadsworth.
62. Foot, Philippa. 1967. "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect." Oxford Review 5. Reprinted in Virtues and Vices. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
63. Foot, Philippa. 1978. Virtues and Vices. Berkeley: University of California Press.
64. Foucault, Michel. 1979. Discipline and Punish. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Random House.
65. Frankfurt, Harry. 1971. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." Journal of Philosophy 68:5-20.
66. Garner, Richard. 1994. Beyond Morality. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
67. Gauthier, David. 1986. Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
68. Gauthier, David. 1991. "Why Contractarianism?" In Contractarianism and Rational Choice, ed. Peter Vallentyne: 15-30. New York: Cambridge University Press.
69. Geach, P. T. 1960. "Ascriptivism." Philosophical Review 69:221-25.
70. Geach, P. T. 1965. "Assertion." Philosophical Review 74:449-65.
71. Gert, Bernard. 1990. "Rationality, Human Nature, and Lists." Ethics 100:279-300.
72. Gert, Bernard. 1998. Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.
73. Gettier, Edmund. 1963. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23:121-23.
74. Gewirth, Alan. 1974. "The 'Is-Ought' Problem Resolved." Reprinted in Human Rights. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
75. Gewirth, Alan. 1978. Reason and Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
76. Gibbard, Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
77. Gibbard, Allan. 2003. Thinking How to Live. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
78. Goldman, Alvin. 1976. "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy 73:771-91.
79. Goldman, Alvin. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
80. Goodman, Nelson. 1979. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. 3rd edition. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
81. Gowans, Christopher, ed. 2000. Moral Disagreements. London: Routledge.
82. Greene, Joshua. Forthcoming. The Terrible, Horrible Truth about Morality.
83. Greene, Joshua, and Haidt, Jonathan. 2002. "How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?" Trends in Cognitive Science 6:517-23.
84. Greene, Joshua, Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., and Darley, J. M. 2004. "The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment." Neuron 44:389-400.
85. Greene, Joshua, Sommerville, R., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., and Cohen, J. D. 2001, September. "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment." Science 293:2105-8.
86. Haack, Susan. 1993. Evidence and Inquiry. Oxford: Blackwell.
87. Habermas, Jürgen. 1990. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Trans. C. Lenhart and S. Weber. Cambridge: MIT Press.
88. Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment." Psychological Review 108:814-34.
89. Haidt, Jonathan, and Baron, Jonathan. 1996. "Social Roles and the Moral Judgment of Acts and Omissions." European Journal of Social Psychology 26:201-18.
90. Haidt, Jonathan, et al. 1993. "Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65:613-28.
91. Hare, R. M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
92. Hare, R. M. 1965. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
93. Hare, R. M. 1981. Moral Thinking. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
94. Harman, Gilbert. 1977. Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.
95. Harman, Gilbert. 1998. "Responses to Critics." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LVIII:207-13.
96. Harman, Gilbert, and Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1996. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell.
97. Harsanyi, John. 1982. "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior." Reprinted in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. A. Sen and B. Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
98. Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
99. Hinckfuss, Ian. 1987. "The Moral Society: Its Structures and Effects." Preprint Series in Environmental Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, 16, Australian National University.
100. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1969. "Deontic Logic and its Philosophical Morals." In Models for Modalities. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Reidel.
101. Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan. New York: Macmillan, 1962.
102. Hooker, Brad, ed. 1996. Truth in Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
103. Hooker, Brad, and Little, Margaret, eds. 2000. Moral Particularism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
104. Horowitz, Tamara. 1998. "Philosophical Intuitions and Psychological Theory." In Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, ed. Michael DePaul and W. Ramsey. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. An earlier version appeared in thics 108 (1998): 367-85.
105. Hudson, W. D., ed. 1969. The Is-Ought Question. New York: St. Martin's.
106. Hume, David. 1739-40. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888.
107. Hume, David. 1748. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888.
108. Hurka, Thomas. 1993. Perfectionism. New York: Oxford University Press.
109. Jackson, Frank. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
110. Jackson, Frank, and Pettit, Philip. 1998. "A Problem for Expressivism." Analysis 58:329-51.
111. Jackson, Frank, and Pettit, Philip, and Smith, Michael. 2000. "Ethical Particularism and Patterns." In Moral Particularism, ed. Brad Hooker and Margaret Little:79-99. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
112. James, William. 1896, June. "The Will to Believe." New World:327-47.
113. Joyce, Richard. 2001. The Myth of Morality. New York: Cambridge University Press.
114. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A., eds. 1982. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
115. Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." Econometrica 47:263-91.
116. Kant, Immanuel. 1785. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959.
117. Kaplan, David. 1989. "Demonstratives." In Themes from Kaplan, ed. Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein:481-563. New York: Oxford University Press.
118. Karjalainen, Antti, and Morton, Adam. 2003. "Contrastive Knowledge." Philosophical Explorations VI(2):74-89.
119. Kitcher, Philip. 1985. Vaulting Ambition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
120. Kitcher, Philip. 1999. "Essence and Perfection." Ethics 100:59-83.
121. Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1981. "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development." In Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I, The Philosophy of Moral Development:101-89. San Francisco: Harper and Row.
122. Kvanvig, Jonathan. 2003. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
123. Lackey, Douglas. 1986. "Taking Risk Seriously." Journal of Philosophy 83:633-40.
124. Lehrer, Keith. 1974. Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
125. Lehrer, Keith. 1990. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder: Westview.
126. Levi, Isaac. 1980. The Enterprise of Knowledge. Cambridge: MIT Press.
127. Levinson, Stephen. 1983. Pragmatics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
128. Lewis, David. 1996. "Elusive Knowledge." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74:549-67.
129. Lipton, Peter. 1991a. "Contrastive Explanation." In Explanation and Its Limits, ed. D. Knowles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
130. Lipton, Peter. 1991b. Inference to the Best Explanation. New York: Routledge.
131. Lockhart, Ted. 2000. Moral Uncertainty and Its Consequences. New York: Oxford University Press.
132. Loeb, Don. 1996. "Generality and Moral Justification." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56:79-96.
133. Loeb, Don. 1998. "Moral Realism and the Argument from Disagreement." Philosophical Studies 90:281-303.
134. Lord, C. G., Ross, L., and Lepper, M. R. 1979. "Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37:2098-99.
135. MacIntyre, Allison. 2001. "Doing Away with Double Effect," Ethics 111:219-55.
136. Mackie, J. L. 1946. "A Refutation of Morals." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 24:77-90.
137. Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, UK: Penguin.
138. Mackie, J. L. 1978. "The Law of the Jungle: Moral Alternatives and Principles of Evolution." Philosophy 53:455-64.
139. Mackie, J. L. 1980. Hume's Moral Theory. London: Routledge.
140. McKeever, Sean, and Ridge, Michael. Forthcoming. Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. New York: Oxford University Press.
141. Mill, John Stuart. 1861. Utilitarianism, ed. Roger Crisp. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
142. Miller, Geoffrey. 2000. The Mating Mind. New York: Doubleday.
143. Moll, Jorge, et al. 2001. "Frontopolar and Anterior Temporal Cortex Activation in a Moral Judgment Task: Preliminary Functional MRI Results in Normal Subjects." Arq. Neuropsiquiatr 59:657-64.
144. Moll, Jorge, et al. 2002a. "Functional Networks in Emotional Moral and Nonmoral Social Judgments." Neuroimage 16:696-703.
145. Moll, Jorge, et al. 2002b. "The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions." Journal of Neuroscience 22:2730-36.
146. Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
147. Morris, Christopher. 1996. "A Contractarian Account of Moral Justification." In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons: 215-42. New York: Oxford University Press.
148. Nelson, Mark. 1995. "Is it Always Fallacious to Derive Values from Facts?" Argumentation 9:553-62.
149. Nelson, Mark. 2003. "Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Scepticism." Ratio 16:63-82.
150. Nichols, Shaun. 2005. Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press.
151. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1887. On the Genealogy of Morals. In Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. W. Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1966.
152. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1888. Twilight of the Idols. In The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Viking Press, 1954.
153. Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
154. Nussbaum, Martha. 1990. Love's Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.
155. Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
156. Paul, Ellen Frankel, Miller, Fred. D., and Paul, Jeffrey, eds. 1988. The New Social Contract. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
157. Paul, Ellen Frankel. eds. 1994. Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press.
158. Paul, Ellen Frankel. eds. 2001. Moral Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press.
159. Peacocke, Christopher. 1986. Thoughts. New York: Blackwell.
160. Peirce, Charles Saunders. 1934. Collected Papers, Vol. 5. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. People v. Young, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 274 (1962).
161. Petrinovich, Lewis, and O'Neill, Patricia. 1996. "Influence of Wording and Framing Effects on Moral Intuitions." Ethology and Sociobiology 17:145-71.
162. Pettit, Philip. 1997. "The Consequentialist Perspective." In Three Methods of Ethics, M. Baron, P. Pettit, and M. Slote: 92-174. Oxford: Blackwell.
163. Pigden, Charles. 1991. "Naturalism." In A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer. Oxford: Blackwell.
164. Plato. 1997a. Meno, in Complete Works, ed. John Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett.
165. Plato. 1997b. Theaetetus, in Complete Works, ed. John Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett.
166. Pollock, John. 1986. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield.
167. Prichard, H. A. 1968. Moral Obligation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
168. Prinz, Jesse. Forthcoming. The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
169. Prior, A. 1964. "Conjunction and Contonktion Revisited." Analysis 24:191-95.
170. Putnam, Hilary. 1981. Reason, Truth, and History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
171. Quinn, Warren. 1989a. "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing," Philosophical Review 98:287-312. Reprinted in Morality and Action. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993: 149-74.
172. Quinn, Warren. 1989b. "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect." Philosophy and Public Affairs 18:334-51. Reprinted in Morality and Action. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993: 175-93.
173. Quinn, Warren. 1993. Morality and Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
174. Rachels, James. 1971. "Egoism and Moral Skepticism." In A New Introduction to Philosophy, ed. Steven M. Cahn. New York: Harper and Row.
175. Radford, Colin. 1966. "Knowledge-By Examples." Analysis 27:1-11.
176. Railton, Peter. 1998. "Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:175-82.
177. Rawls, John. 1951. "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics." Philosophical Review 60:177-97.
178. Rawls, John. 1958. "Justice as Fairness." Philosophical Review 47:164-94.
179. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
180. Regis, Edward, ed. 1984. Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
181. Richards, Robert J. 1987. "A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics." Appendix to Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
182. Roberts, R. C. 1988. "What an Emotion Is: A Sketch." Philosophical Review 97:183-209.
183. Robinson, R. 1948. "The Emotive Theory of Ethics." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume.
184. Ross, W. D. 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
185. Ruse, Michael. 1998. Taking Darwin Seriously. Amherst, NY: Prometheus.
186. Ruse, Michael, and Wilson, Edward O. 1986. "Moral Philosophy as Applied Science." Philosophy 61:173-92.
187. Russell, Bertrand. 1905. "On Denoting." Mind 14:479-93.
188. Russell, Bertrand. 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. New York: Allen and Unwin.
189. Ryle, Gilbert. 1958. "On Forgetting the Difference between Right and Wrong." In Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
190. Sanford, David. 1984. "Infinite Regress Arguments." In Principles of Philosophical Reasoning, ed. James H. Fetzer. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.
191. Sartwell, Crispin. 1991. "Knowledge Is True Belief." American Philosophical Quarterly 28:157-65
192. Sartwell, Crispin. 1992. "Why Knowledge Is Merely True Belief." Journal of Philosophy 89:167-80.
193. Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. 1985. "Coherence and Models for Moral Theorizing." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66:170-90.
194. Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. ed. 1988a. Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
195. Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. 1988b. "Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12:433-57.
196. Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. 1996. "Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory." In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons: 137-89. New York: Oxford University Press.
197. Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. 2001. "Mill's 'Proof' of the Principle of Utility: A More Than Half-Hearted Defense." In Moral Knowledge, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, and Jeffrey Paul: 330-60. New York: Cambridge University Press.
198. Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
199. Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004. "From Contextualism to Contrastivism." Philosophical Studies 119:73-103.
200. Scheffler, Samuel. 1982. The Rejection of Consequentialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
201. Schneewind, Jerome, ed. 1990. Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, Vols. I and II. New York: Cambridge University Press.
202. Searle, John. 1962. "Meaning and Speech Acts." Philosophical Review 71:423-32.
203. Searle, John. 1964. "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is.'" Philosophical Review 73:43-58.
204. Searle, John. 1969. Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
205. Sextus Empiricus. 1996. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. In The Skeptic Way, trans. Benson Mates. New York: Oxford University Press.
206. Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. Moral Realism: A Defense. New York: Oxford University Press.
207. Shope, Robert. 1983. The Analysis of Knowing. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
208. Sidgwick, Henry. 1907. Methods of Ethics. 7th edition. New York: Macmillan.
209. Singer, Peter, 1974. "Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium." Monist 58:490-517.
210. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1984. " 'Ought' Conversationally Implies 'Can.'" Philosophical Review 93:249-61.
211. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1987. Review of Spreading the Word, by Simon Blackburn. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:163-66.
212. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1988. Moral Dilemmas. Oxford: Blackwell.
213. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1990. "Moral Experience and Justification." Southern Journal of Philosophy 29, Supplement:89-96.
214. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1992. "An Argument for Consequentialism." In "Ethics," special issue, Philosophical Perspectives 6:399-421.
215. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1993. "Some Problems for Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism." Philosophical Studies 69:297-313.
216. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1995a. "Nihilism and Skepticism about Moral Obligations." Utilitas 7:217-36.
217. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1995b. Review of The Structure of Justification, by Robert Audi. Philosophical Quarterly 45:394-97.
218. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1996a. "Moral Skepticism and Justification." In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons. New York: Oxford University Press.
219. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1996b. "Moral Dilemmas and Rights." In Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, ed. H. E. Mason: 48-65. New York: Oxford University Press.
220. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1996c. Review of Morality, Normativity, and Society, by David Copp. Philosophical Review, 105:552-54.
221. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1996d. Review of Morality and Action, by Warren Quinn. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4:193-96.
222. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1999a. "An Argument for Descriptivism." Southern Journal of Philosophy 37(2):281-91.
223. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1999b. " 'MPP, RIP' RIP." Philosophical Papers 28:125-31.
224. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1999c. "Begging the Question." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77:174-91.
225. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1999d. "Some Varieties of Particularism." Metaphilosophy 30:1-12.
226. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1999e. "Explanation and Justification in Moral Epistemology." In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 1, Ethics, ed. Klaus Brinkman. Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center.
227. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2000a. "Expressivism and Embedding." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXI(3):677-93.
228. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2000b. "From 'Is' to 'Ought' in Moral Epistemology." Argumentation 14:159-174.
229. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2001a. "R. M. Hare." In A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, ed. A. P. Martinich and David Sosa: 326-33. Oxford: Blackwell.
230. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2001b. "Moral Intuitionism." In Encyclopedia of Ethics. 2nd edition, ed. Lawrence Becker and Charlotte Becker: 879-82. New York: Routledge.
231. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2002a. "What's in a Contrast Class?" Analysis 62:75-85.
232. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2002b. "Gert Contra Consequentialism." In Rationality, Rules, and Ideals, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Robert Audi: 145-63. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
233. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2002c. "Moral Relativity and Intuitionism." In "Realism and Relativism," special issue, Philosophical Issues 12:305-28.
234. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2002d . "Recusal and Bush v. Gore." Law and Philosophy 21:221-48.
235. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2004a. "Classy Pyrrhonism." In Pyrrhonian Skepticism, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. New York: Oxford University Press.
236. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. ed. 2004b. Pyrrhonian Skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press.
237. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. Forthcoming. "A Contrastivist Manifesto." Social Epistemology.
238. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Audi, Robert, eds. 2002. Rationality, Rules, and Ideals. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
239. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Moor, James, and Fogelin, Robert. 1986. "A Defense of Modus Ponens." Journal of Philosophy 83:296-300.
240. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Timmons, Mark, eds. 1996. Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
241. Smith, Michael. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell.
242. Smith, Michael. 2001. "Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Non-Cognitivism in Ethics." Ratio 14:93-115.
243. Snare, Francis. 1980. "The Diversity of Morals." Mind 89:353-69.
244. Sober, Elliott, and Wilson, David Sloan. 1998. Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
245. Sorensen, Roy. 2001. Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
246. Sosa, Ernest. 2004. "Two False Dichotomies: Foundationalism/Coherentism and Internalism/Externalism." In Pyrrhonian Skepticism, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. New York: Oxford University Press.
247. Stevenson, Charles. 1944. Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press.
248. Stine, Gail. 1976. "Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure." Philosophical Studies 29:249-61.
249. Stoljar, Daniel. 1993. "Emotivism and Truth Conditions." Philosophical Studies 70:81-101.
250. Strawson, Peter. 1950. "On Referring." Mind 59:320-44.
251. Sturgeon, Nicholas. 1982. "Brandt's Moral Empiricism." Philosophical Review 91:389-422.
252. Sturgeon, Nicholas. 1984. "Moral Explanations." In Morality, Reason, and Truth, ed. David Copp and David Zimmerman: 49-78. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.
253. Sturgeon, Nicholas. 1994. "Moral Disagreement and Moral Relativism." In Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred. D. Miller, and Jeffrey Paul. New York: Cambridge University Press.
254. Tarski, Alfred. 1944. "The Semantic Conception of Truth." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4:341-75.
255. Taurek, John. 1977. "Should the Numbers Count?" Philosophy and Public Affairs 6:293-316.
256. Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1976. "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem." The Monist 59:204-17. Reprinted in Rights, Restitution, and Risk, ed. W. Parent. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.
257. Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1985. "The Trolley Problem." Yale Law Journal 94:1395-1415. Reprinted in Rights, Restitution, and Risk, ed. W. Parent. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.
258. Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1986. Rights, Restitution, and Risk, ed. W. Parent. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
259. Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1990. The Realm of Rights. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
260. Timmons, Mark. 1996. "Outline of a Contextualist Moral Epistemology." In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons. New York: Oxford University Press.
261. Timmons, Mark. 1998. Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. New York: Oxford University Press.
262. Tolhurst, William. 1986. "Supervenience, Externalism, and Moral Knowledge." Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, Supplement:43-55.
263. Tolhurst, William. 1987. "The Argument from Moral Disagreement." Ethics 97:610-21.
264. Tolhurst, William. 1990. "On the Epistemic Value of Moral Experience." Southern Journal of Philosophy 29, Supplement:67-87.
265. Tolhurst, William. 1998. "Seemings." American Philosophical Quarterly 35:293-302.
266. Unger, Peter. 1996. Living High and Letting Die. New York: Oxford University Press.
267. Vallentyne, Peter, ed. 1991. Contractarianism and Rational Choice. New York: Cambridge University Press.
268. Van Fraassen, Bas C. 1980. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
269. Van Roojen, Mark. 1996. "Expressivism and Irrationality." Philosophical Review 105:311-35.
270. Van Roojen, Mark. 1999. "Reflective Moral Equilibrium and Psychological Theory." Ethics 109:846-57.
271. Vogel, Jonathan. 1990. "Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?" In Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism, ed. M. Roth and G. Ross. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
272. Walker, Margaret Urban. 1996. "Feminist Skepticism, Authority, and Transparency." In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons. New York: Oxford University Press.
273. Walker, Margaret Urban. 1998. Moral Understandings. New York: Routledge.
274. Warnock, Geoffrey. 1971. The Object of Morality. London: Methuen.
275. Watson, Gary. 1975. "Free Agency." Journal of Philosophy 72:205-20.
276. Wellman, Carl. 1971. Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
277. Werner, Richard. 1983. "Moral Realism." Ethics 93:653-79.
278. Wheatley, T., and Haidt, J. 2005. "Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe." Psychological Science.
279. White, Morton. 1981. What Is and What Ought to Be Done. New York: Oxford University Press.
280. Williams, Bernard. 1981. "Internal and External Reasons." Reprinted in Moral Luck:101-13. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
281. Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
282. Wilson, E. O. 1975. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
283. Zangwill, Nick. 1994. "Moral Mind-Independence." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:205-18.
284. Zangwill, Nick. 2000. "Against Analytic Moral Functionalism." Ratio 13.
285. Zimmerman, David. 1984. "Moral Realism and Explanatory Necessity," In Morality, Reason, and Truth, ed. David Copp and David Zimmerman:79-103. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.