In Defence of Objective Bayesianism

In Defence of Objective Bayesianism

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-192

  Williamson, Jon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bayesian epistemology; Bayesianism; Maxent; Maximum nntropy; Objective bayesianism; Probability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84865567025     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228003.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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