Buying bad behavior: Tournament incentives and securities class action lawsuits

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 37, Issue 7, 2016, Pages 1354-1378

  Shi, Wei ^a   Connelly, Brian L ^b   Sanders, Wm Gerard ^c  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b AUBURN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO   (United States)

Author keywords

organizational misconduct; pay dispersion; securities lawsuits; top management team; tournament theory

Indexed keywords

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; MANAGEMENT SCIENCE; MANAGERS; MOBILE SECURITY;

ORGANIZATIONAL MISCONDUCT; PAY DISPERSIONS; SECURITIES LAWSUITS; TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS; TOURNAMENT THEORY;

LAWS AND LEGISLATION;

EID: 84936149201     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2400     Document Type: Article

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