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Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 365-395

Reputational penalties and the merits of class-action securities litigation

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 33845809073     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/505371     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (147)

References (23)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.