How many winners are good to have?. On tournaments with sabotage

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 65, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 682-702

  Harbring, Christine ^a   Irlenbusch, Bernd ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Experiments; Personnel economics; Relative performance evaluation; Sabotage

Indexed keywords

EID: 39149132803     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.03.004     Document Type: Article

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