Institutional monitoring through shareholder litigation

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 95, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 356-383

  Agnes Cheng, C S ^a   He Huang, Henry ^b   Li, Yinghua ^c   Lobo, Gerald ^d  

^a LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRAIRIE VIEW A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Institutional investors; Monitoring; Shareholder litigation

Indexed keywords

EID: 75149155025     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.11.006     Document Type: Article

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