A randomised Monty Hall experiment: The positive effect of conditional frequency feedback

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 176-192

  Saenen, Lore ^a   Van Dooren, Wim ^a   Onghena, Patrick ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Conditional feedback; Decision making; Frequencies; Monty Hall dilemma; Probability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924261448     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2014.918562     Document Type: Article

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