Politics and trade cooperation in the nineteenth century: The “agreeable customs” of 1815–1914

Politics and Trade Cooperation in the Nineteenth Century: The Agreeable Customs of 1815-1914

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-426

  Pahre, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84926088527     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511619601     Document Type: Book

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