Democratic politics and international trade negotiations: Elections and divided government as constraints on trade liberalization

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 117-146

  Milner, Helen V ^a   Rosendorff, B Peter ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031060818     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002797041001006     Document Type: Article

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