An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism

International Organization

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 269-299

  Garrett, Geoffrey ^a   Tsebelis, George ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040455313     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0020818300028563     Document Type: Review

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