Constituencies and preferences in international bargaining

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 383-407

  Tarar, Ahmer ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Domestic constraints; International bargaining; International negotiations; Two level games

Indexed keywords

EID: 20744451071     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002705276567     Document Type: Article

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