Theoretical problems in negotiating trade liberalization

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 209-232

  Ethier, Wilfred J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Concession diversion; F02; F13; Incomplete contracts; Insurance triangle; Multilateral liberalization; Reciprocal conflict

Indexed keywords

EID: 0009026601     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00027-1     Document Type: Article

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