The phantom menace: Omitted variable bias in econometric research

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 341-352

  Clarke, Kevin A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Control variables; Omitted variable bias; Research design; Specification

Indexed keywords

EID: 29244477248     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940500339183     Document Type: Article

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