Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation

International Organization

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 269-305

  Fearon, James D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032355311     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002081898753162820     Document Type: Article

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