House rules: Institutional choice and United States trade negotiations

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 195-213

  Pahre, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act; Trade Promotion Authority; Two level games; Veto players

Indexed keywords

EID: 4644259155     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940490487252     Document Type: Review

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