Not all dictators are equal: Coups, fraudulent elections, and the selective targeting of democratic sanctions

Journal of Peace Research

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 17-31

  von Soest, Christian ^a   Wahman, Michael ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

authoritarian regimes; coup d tat; fraudulent elections; imposition; sanctions; trigger events; vulnerability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921056774     PISSN: 00223433     EISSN: 14603578     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022343314551081     Document Type: Article

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