Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 27-50

  Morgan, T Clifton ^a   Schwebach, Valerie L ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FOREIGN POLICY; GEOPOLITICS; SANCTION; THEORETICAL STUDY; TRADE POLICY; ECONOMIC SANCTION; GEOPOLITICAL STUDY; INTERNATIONAL CRISIS; MODELLING APPROACH; POLICY INSTRUMENT;

EID: 0030608618     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0020-8833.00032     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. BALDWIN, D. (1985) Economic Statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2. BARBER, J. (1979) Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument. International Affairs 55:367-384.
3. BRECHER, M., J. WILKENFELD, AND S. MOSER (1988) Crises in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
4. BROWN-JOHN, C. L. (1975) Multilateral Sanctions in International Law: A Comparative Analysis. New York: Praeger.
5. DAOUDI, M. S., AND M. S. DAJANI (1983) Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
6. DOXEY, M. (1971) Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. DOXEY, M. (1972) International Sanctions. International Organization 26:527-550.
8. ENELOW, J. M., AND M. J. HINICH (1984) The Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9. GALTUNG, J. (1967) On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples for the Case of Rhodesia. World Politics 19:378-416.
10. GOORDON, D. F. (1983) "The Politics of International Sanctions." In Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics, edited by M. Nincic and P. Wallensteen. New York: Praeger.
11. HOFFMANN, F. (1967) The Functions of Economic Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis. Journal of Peace Research 3:140-159.
12. Houston Chronicle (May 31, 1992) "U.N. Slaps Sanctions on Yugoslavia" (p. 1A): and "Haiti Trade Embargo Chalked Up As Failure" (p. 21A).
13. Houston Chronicle (May 31, 1992) "U.N. Slaps Sanctions on Yugoslavia" (p. 1A): and "Haiti Trade Embargo Chalked Up As Failure" (p. 21A).
14. HUFBAUER, G. C., J. J. SCHOTT, AND K. A. ELLIOTT (1990a) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. Washington, DC: Institute of International Economics.
15. HUFBAUER, G. C., J. J. SCHOTT, AND K. A. ELLIOTT (1990b) "The Big Squeeze: Why the Sanctions on Iraq Will Work." Washington Post, December 9, p. K1.
16. HUFBAUER, G. C., J. J. SCHOTT, AND K. A. ELLIOTT (1991) "Sanctions Will Bite - and Soon." New York Times, January 14, p. A17.
17. HUTH, P. K. (1988) Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
18. KNORR, K. (1977) "International Economic Leverage and Its Uses." In Economic Issues and National Security, edited by K. Knorr and F. Trager, pp. 99-126. Lawrence, KS: Allen Press.
19. LINDSAY, J. M. (1986) Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination. International Studies Quarterly 30:153-173.
20. MARTIN, L. L. (1992) Coercive Cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
21. MORGAN, T. C. (1984) A Spatial Model of Crisis Bargaining. International Studies Quarterly 28:407-426.
22. MORGAN, T. C. (1990a) Issue Linkages in International Crisis Bargaining. American Journal of Political Science 34:311-333.
23. MORGAN, T. C. (1990b) Power, Resolve and Bargaining in International Crises: A Spatial Theory. International Interactions 15:279-302.
24. MORGAN, T. C. (1993) "Mediators, Allies, and Opportunists: Third Parties in International Crises." In The New Science of Politics, edited by P. James et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
25. MORGAN, T. C. (1994) Untying the Knot of War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
26. MORGAN, T. C., AND V. L. SCHWEBACH (1995) Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: The Role of Domestic Politics. International Interactions.
27. NASH, J. F. (1950) The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18:155-162.
28. NOSSAL, K. R. (1989) International Sanctions as International Punishment. International Organization 43:301-322.
29. PAARLBERG, R. L. (1983) "Using Food Power." In Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics, edited by M. Nincic and P. Wallensteen. New York: Praeger.
30. PEN, J. (1952) A General Theory of Bargaining. American Economic Review 27:24-42.
31. RENWICK, R. (1981) Economic Sanctions. Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
32. SCHREIBER, A. P. (1973) Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Policy. World Politics 25:387-413.
33. SCHWEBACH, V. L. (1995) Sanctions as Signals: A Line in the Sand or a Lack of Resolve? Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Peace Science Society, Columbus, Ohio.
34. STRACK, H. (1978) Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
35. TSEBELIS, G. (1990) Are Sanctions Effective? A Game-Theoretic Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 34:3-28.
36. WAGNER, R. H. (1988) Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence. International Organization 42:461-482.
37. WALLENSTEEN, P. (1968) Characteristics of Economic Sanctions. Journal of Peace Research 3:248-267.
38. ZEUTHEN, F. (1968) Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare. New York: Augustus M. Kelley.