Structural estimation of economic sanctions: From initiation to outcomes

Journal of Peace Research

Volumn 47, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 561-573

  Whang, Taehee ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

democracy; economic sanctions; EITM (Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models); issue salience; military alliance; structural estimation

Indexed keywords

EID: 77954571599     PISSN: 00223433     EISSN: 14603578     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022343310376868     Document Type: Article

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