Dealing with tyranny: International sanctions and the survival of authoritarian rulers1

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 335-359

  Escribà Folch, Abel ^a   Wright, Joseph ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTHORITARIANISM; DECENTRALIZATION; MILITARY GOVERNMENT; MODEL TEST; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICAL THEORY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 77954567759     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: 14682478     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00590.x     Document Type: Article

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