Potential early phase success and ultimate failure of economic sanctions: A VAR approach with an application to Iran

Journal of Peace Research

Volumn 50, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 721-736

  Dizaji, Sajjad F ^a   van Bergeijk, Peter A G ^b  

^a TARBIAT MODARES UNIVERSITY   (Iran)

^b INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Iran; JEL: F51; sanctions; vector autoregressive model

Indexed keywords

EID: 84886442722     PISSN: 00223433     EISSN: 14603578     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022343313485487     Document Type: Article

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