Multiple audiences and reputation building in international conflicts

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 54, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 860-882

  Clare, Joe ^a   Danilovic, Vesna ^b  

^a LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

Author keywords

conflict; international audiences; militarized disputes; past behavior; reputation; rivalries

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649597229     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002710372741     Document Type: Article

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