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Volumn 53, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 241-265

How long do economic sanctions last? Examining the sanctioning process through duration

(2)  Bolks, Sean M a   Al Sowayel, Dina a  

a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0034416112     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/106591290005300202     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (85)

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