Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 45, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 683-713

  Escribà Folch, Abel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

authoritarian regimes; economic sanctions; public expenditures; repression; revenues

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860759052     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414011427883     Document Type: Article

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