Friends or foes? major trading partners and the success of economic sanctions

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 427-447

  McLean, Elena ^a   Whang, Taehee ^a  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; ECONOMIC RELATIONS; HYPOTHESIS TESTING; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; NUMERICAL MODEL; POLITICAL ECONOMY; PROBABILITY; THEORETICAL STUDY; TRADE RELATIONS;

EID: 77954578832     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: 14682478     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00594.x     Document Type: Article

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