Reciprocity and the structural determinants of the international sanctions network

Social Networks

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 5-22

  Cranmer, Skyler J ^a   Heinrich, Tobias ^b   Desmarais, Bruce A ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

ERGM; Political networks; Sanctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 84888031215     PISSN: 03788733     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socnet.2013.01.001     Document Type: Article

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