The emotions: A philosophical introduction

The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1-146

  Deonna, Julien A ^a   Teroni, Fabrice ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

^c Swiss Centre for Research in the Affective Sciences   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84917305001     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203721742     Document Type: Book

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