Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism

Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-320

  Recanati, François ^a,b  

^a INSTITUT JEAN NICOD   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Content; Context; First person; Immunity to error through misidentification; Indexicality; Perspective; Relativism; Situations; Subjectivity; Unarticulated constituents

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921918112     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199230532.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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