Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action

Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-224

  Alvarez, Maria ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Action explanation; Actions; Anscombe; Beliefs; Desires; Facts; Humean theory; Motivation; Practical reasoning; Reasons

Indexed keywords

EID: 79957984488     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550005.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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