Are there passive desires?

Dialectica

Volumn 63, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 133-155

  Wall, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350635918     PISSN: 00122017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01187.x     Document Type: Review

References (60)

1. ANSCOMBE, G. E. M. 1957, Intention, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
2. ARMSTRONG, D. 1968, A Materialist Theory of Mind, London: Routledge
3. AYER, A. J. 1936, Language, Truth, and Logic, London: Gollancz
4. BIRD, A. 1998, 'Dispositions and Antidotes', The Philosophical Quarterly 48, pp. 227-234
5. BLACKBURN, S. 1984, Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press
6. BRADDON-MITCHELL, D. and J1ACKSON, F. 1996, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Malden, MA: Blackwell
7. BRINK, D. 1989, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
8. COPP, D. 1997, 'Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith's TheMoral Problem', Ethics 108, pp. 33-54
9. CURRIE, G. and RAVENSCROFT, I. 2002, Recreative Minds, New York: Oxford University Press
10. DANCY, J. 1993, Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell
11. DARWALL, S. 1983, Impartial Reasons, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
12. DAVIDSON, D. 1969, 'How isWeakness of theWill Possible' reprinted in 1980, Essays on Actions and Events, New York: Clarendon Press
13. DAVIDSON, D. 1971, 'Agency' reprinted in 1980: Essays on Actions and Events, NewYork: Clarendon Press
14. DRETSKE, F. 1988, Explaining Behaviour, Reasons in a World of Causes, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
15. FARA, M. 2006, 'Dispositions', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online
16. FEHIGE, C. 2001, 'Instrumentalism', in: E. Millgram, ed. , Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
17. FERNANDEZ, J. 2007, 'Desire and Self-Knowledge', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85, pp. 517-536
18. FIELD, H. 1978, 'Mental Representation', Erkenntnis 13, pp. 9-61
19. FOOT, P. 1972, 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperitives', Philosophical Review 81, pp. 305-316
20. FRANKENA, W. 1958, 'Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy', in: A. Meldon, ed. , Essays in Moral Philosophy, pp. 40-81
21. GERT, J. 2005, 'Breaking the Law of Desire', Erkenntnis 62, pp. 295-319
22. GIBBARD, A. 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
23. HARE, R. M. 1952, The Language of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press
24. HUMBERSTONE, L. 1992, 'Direction of Fit', Mind 101, pp. 59-83
25. HUME, D. 1975, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in: L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed. , Oxford: Clarendon Press
26. JOHNSTON, M. 1992, 'How to Speak of the Colours', Philosophical Studies 68, pp. 221-263
27. KIM, J. 1998, Philosophy of Mind, Boulder, CO: Westview Press
28. LEWIS, D. K. 1983, 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain' in Philosophical Papers I, New York: Oxford University Press
29. LEWIS, D. 1997, 'Finkish Dispositions', The Philosophical Quarterly 47, pp. 143-158
30. MACKIE, J. L. 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London: Penguin
31. MARTIN, C. B. 1994, 'Dispositions and Conditionals', The Philosophical Quarterly 44, pp. 1-8
32. MCDOWELL, J. 1978, 'Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperitives?' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, pp. 13-29
33. MCNAUGHTON, D. 1988, Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics, New York: Basil Blackwell
34. MELE, A. 1987, Irrationality, New York: Oxford University Press
35. MILL, J. S. 1863/1998, Utilitarianism, ed. by R. Crisp, New York: Oxford University Press
36. MILLGRAM, E. 1997, Practical Induction, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
37. MOLNAR, G. 1999, 'Are Dispositions Reducible?' The Philosophical Quarterly 49, pp. 1-17
38. NAGEL, T. 1970, The Possibility of Altruism, Oxford: Oxford University Press
39. NICHOLS, S. and STICH, S. 2003, Mind-Reading, New York: Oxford University Press
40. ODDIE, G. 2005, Value, Reality, Desire, New York: Oxford University Press
41. PLATTS, M. 1979, 'Moral Reality', in Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Language, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
42. RAILTON, P. 1986, 'Moral Realism', Philosophical Review 95, pp. 163-207
43. ROSATI, M. 2006, 'Moral Motivation', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online
44. RYLE, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson and Co
45. SCANLON, T. 1982, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in: A. Sen and B. Williams, eds, Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 103-128
46. SCANLON, T. 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
47. SCHROEDER, T. 2004, Three Faces of Desire, New York: Oxford University Press
48. SHAFER-LANDAU, R. 2003, Moral Realism: A Defense, New York: Clarendon Press
49. SKINNER, B. F. 1953, Science and Human Behavior, New York: McMillan
50. SMITH, M. 1994, The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell
51. SMITH, M. 1998, 'Galen Strawson and the Weather Watchers', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, pp. 449-454
52. STALNAKER, R. 1984, Inquiry, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
53. STAMPE, D. 1987, 'The Authority of Desire', The Philosophical Review 96, pp. 335-381
54. STOLJAR, D. 2006, 'Two Conceivability Arguments Compared', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CVII
55. STRAWSON, G. 1994, Mental Reality, New York: Oxford University Press
56. STRAWSON, G. 1998, 'Precis of Mental Reality'& 'Reply to Smith', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, pp. 433-454 & 471-483
57. TENENBAUM, S. 1999, 'The Judgment of a Weak Will', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, pp. 875-911
58. VELLEMAN, J. D. 2000, 'On the Aim of Belief', in The Possibility of Practical Reason, New York: Oxford University Press
59. WATSON, G. 1975, 'Free Agency', Journal of Philosophy 57
60. WIGGINS, D. 1987, Needs, Values, Truth, Essays in the Philosophy of Value, New York: Oxford University Press