Are emotions perceptual experiences of value?

Ratio

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 93-107

  Whiting, Demian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HULL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857527065     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: 14679329     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00518.x     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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