Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action

Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-188

  Schueler, G F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO   (United States)

Author keywords

Action; Causal explanation; Davidson; Normative; Practical deliberation; Purposes; Reasons; Teleological explanation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921982204     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199250375.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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