On acting rationally against one's best judgment

Ethics

Volumn 110, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 488-513

  Arpaly, Nomy ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034164930     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233321     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. When talking in this article about the rationality of an agent's action, I am referring to the rationality displayed by the agent in performing that action. A rational course of action, as I understand it here, is a course of action which the agent is actually rational in taking as opposed to a course of action which the agent would take if she were rational. For more on this distinction, see Steve Darwall, "Rational Acts," Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 33-57.
2. An analogous conflict of perspectives appears in ethics: if an ethical theory is seen as a moral agent's manual, it is a failure for it not to provide easy, practicable instructions for getting out of certain dilemmas, while if an ethical theory is aimed solely at providing an account of the moral, it maybe a blow to the theory's credibility if it entails that one can easily find one's way out of certain dilemmas - after all, a true account of moral life should not imply that the moral life is epistemically easy. For an ethics-related discussion of the relation between accounts and manuals, see Peler Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 137-71. The idea that it is not always an advantage for a moral theory to provide easy solutions to practical dilemmas is often expressed by proponents of virtue ethics. See, e.g., Rosalind Hursthouse, "Virtue Theory and Abortion," Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (1991): 223-46.
3. An analogous conflict of perspectives appears in ethics: if an ethical theory is seen as a moral agent's manual, it is a failure for it not to provide easy, practicable instructions for getting out of certain dilemmas, while if an ethical theory is aimed solely at providing an account of the moral, it maybe a blow to the theory's credibility if it entails that one can easily find one's way out of certain dilemmas - after all, a true account of moral life should not imply that the moral life is epistemically easy. For an ethics-related discussion of the relation between accounts and manuals, see Peler Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 137-71. The idea that it is not always an advantage for a moral theory to provide easy solutions to practical dilemmas is often expressed by proponents of virtue ethics. See, e.g., Rosalind Hursthouse, "Virtue Theory and Abortion," Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (1991): 223-46.
4. See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 24.
5. Donald Davidson, "How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?" in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 21-41, 31.
6. Ibid., p. 41.
7. Davidson first pointed out that akrasia is not an ethical problem, as it occurs in cases such as the toothbrushing case. He also defends the view that akrasia is the result of irrationality in reasoning, as opposed to the result of volitional failure (I take it that an agent taking a course of action because of a volitional failure would not be any more rational than an agent acting out of a failure of reasoning). He does not, however, address the possibility that akratic action can sometimes be neither the result of failure of reasoning, nor the result of volitional failure, nor the result of any sort of failure whatsoever but, rather, a rational action.
8. The literature based on this assumption is enormous and includes authors who are very different from Davidson. See, e.g., David Pears, Motivated Irrationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); and Alfred Mele, Irrationality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
9. The literature based on this assumption is enormous and includes authors who are very different from Davidson. See, e.g., David Pears, Motivated Irrationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); and Alfred Mele, Irrationality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
10. Different theories describe the schism in different ways - e.g., as schism between absolute and relativized judgment. This is immaterial to my argument. I am willing to agree that there exists inconsistency or incoherence n the akratic's mind but insist that sometimes far greater irrationality is at hand if the agent follows her best judgment.
11. Frankfurt puts it to us that if a person decided, upon deliberation, that he should destroy the earth in order to avoid a minor injury to his finger but cannot bring himself to perform the destruction, he would be somewhat irrational, but if he were to make such a decision to destroy the earth and have no inner barriers to following through with this decision, then he would have completely taken leave of his senses. Many best judgments, Frankfurt indicates, take a somewhat crazy person to form, but a much crazier person to actually follow, and shouldn't our intuitions about sanity and insanity be relevant to the way we view rationality and irrationality? Harry Frankfurt, "Rationality and the Unthinkable," in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988), pp. 177-90. I agree with Frankfurt that intuitions about sanity similar to those invoked by his Earth-destruction story should not be ignored by anyone giving an account of rationality, and later I use them to help support my conclusion. However, in relying exclusively on intuitions about sanity, and insisting that the earth destroyer as described would be ir-rational whatever else is known about his desires, Frankfurt is vulnerable to the accusation that his conclusion depends on the assumption that there are external reasons for actions. My own argument depends on no such assumption. Alison McIntyre, "Is Akratic Action Always Irrational?" in Identity, Character and Morality, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amelie Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 379-400. While I agree with Mclntyre's criticism of the akrasia literature, I find that her positive arguments are aimed more at the irrationality of being obstinate and the benefits of the ability to be the kind of person who is sometimes weak willed than at the actual rationality of some akratic actions.
12. Frankfurt puts it to us that if a person decided, upon deliberation, that he should destroy the earth in order to avoid a minor injury to his finger but cannot bring himself to perform the destruction, he would be somewhat irrational, but if he were to make such a decision to destroy the earth and have no inner barriers to following through with this decision, then he would have completely taken leave of his senses. Many best judgments, Frankfurt indicates, take a somewhat crazy person to form, but a much crazier person to actually follow, and shouldn't our intuitions about sanity and insanity be relevant to the way we view rationality and irrationality? Harry Frankfurt, "Rationality and the Unthinkable," in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988), pp. 177-90. I agree with Frankfurt that intuitions about sanity similar to those invoked by his Earth-destruction story should not be ignored by anyone giving an account of rationality, and later I use them to help support my conclusion. However, in relying exclusively on intuitions about sanity, and insisting that the earth destroyer as described would be ir-rational whatever else is known about his desires, Frankfurt is vulnerable to the accusation that his conclusion depends on the assumption that there are external reasons for actions. My own argument depends on no such assumption. Alison McIntyre, "Is Akratic Action Always Irrational?" in Identity, Character and Morality, ed. Owen Flanagan and Amelie Rorty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 379-400. While I agree with Mclntyre's criticism of the akrasia literature, I find that her positive arguments are aimed more at the irrationality of being obstinate and the benefits of the ability to be the kind of person who is sometimes weak willed than at the actual rationality of some akratic actions.
13. Thomas Hill, "Weakness of Will and Character," Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 93-115. Hill, while not actually arguing for the rationality of some akratic actions, gestures toward this conclusion in pointing out that cases of acting against one's best judgment are very different from one another and do not, upon sensitive examination, point to the existence of a unified phenomenon which one may label "weakness of will" and regard universally as a vice.
14. This does not imply that acting rationality always involves acting out of self-interest, as some of one's desires may be altruistic.
15. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
16. Smith later points out that it would he more precise to say that the person who believes that she should Φ in C is committed to believing that if she were fully rational, she would desire that, were she her actual, imperfectly rational self, she would Φ in C. Smith makes this correction, e.g., in his reply to Swanton (1996) in order to answer objections based on the idea that sometimes one's hypothetical fully rational self is so different from the actual self that it makes little sense for the two selves to desire the same things. I take his response to be generally effective, and in any case, the difference between the various versions of Smith's claim does not matter to my subsequent discussion. Michael Smith, "Normative Reasons and Full Rationality: Reply to Swanton," Analysis 56 (1996): 160-68.
17. Smith, The Moral Problem, p. 148.
18. It is especially not my point to ascribe to Smith any particular theory about the genesis of akratic action.
19. See James Dreier, "The Moral Problem," Mind 105 (1996): 363-67; and Geoff Sayre-McCord, "The Metaethical Problem," Ethics 108 (1997): 55-83.
20. See James Dreier, "The Moral Problem," Mind 105 (1996): 363-67; and Geoff Sayre-McCord, "The Metaethical Problem," Ethics 108 (1997): 55-83.
21. See Michael Smith, "In Defense of The Moral Problem: A Reply to Brink, Copp, and Sayre-McCord," Ethics 108 (1997): 84-119, p. 100, and "Normative Reasons and Full Rationality," p. 162.
22. See Michael Smith, "In Defense of The Moral Problem: A Reply to Brink, Copp, and Sayre-McCord," Ethics 108 (1997): 84-119, p. 100, and "Normative Reasons and Full Rationality," p. 162.
23. If we thought of Sam not as developing or failing to develop a desire to become a hermit but as developing or failing to develop the absolute judgment "I must become a hermit" from his all relativized judgment that he should become a hermit, the big picture would not change: it would still make Sam's psyche more coherent not to develop that absolute judgment, which would accommodate one belief but contradict many more.
24. A similar position to the coherence view of rationality is the view that judgments of practical rationality, like judgments of probability, are always judgments of rationality given a certain set of beliefs or conditions. Smith may be alluding to this position in arguing that Sam would be irrational in not becoming a hermit given that he believes that he should become a hermit. I would, however, argue that given the whole story about Sam's beliefs and desires, he would be less rational in becoming a hermit than in not becoming one and that since the latter involves more that is relevant to what Sam has a reason to do, it is a better basis for determining whether, all things considered, Sam acted rationally or not.
25. My point regarding Paul's and Sam's cases does not depend on the claim that emotions have cognitive content. Even if they do not, it is still true that Sam is not irrational simply because he felt anxiety while he was deliberating but because anxiety, or something else, caused him to make an invalid inference. In the case of Paul, even if one does not assume that his anxiety was by itself somehow reasonable, it is obvious that it did not prevent him from reaching a practical conclusion in a valid manner.
26. In some contexts, the view that akrasia is a form of irrationality is contrasted with the view that it is the result of failure of self-control or volition. I find it hard to see how failure of self-control or volition can be a rationa process - if it is not irrational, it is at least nonrational. Again, the assumption that there must be some process is evident in nearly all of the extensive literature about weakness of will From Davidson, "Howls Weakness of the Will Possible?" (n. 4 above), to Amelie Rorty, "Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1980): 333-46, and many more such titles, the question always appears to be taken to mean "What kind of unfortunate mental glitch causes one to act against one's best judgment?"
27. In some contexts, the view that akrasia is a form of irrationality is contrasted with the view that it is the result of failure of self-control or volition. I find it hard to see how failure of self-control or volition can be a rationa process - if it is not irrational, it is at least nonrational. Again, the assumption that there must be some process is evident in nearly all of the extensive literature about weakness of will From Davidson, "Howls Weakness of the Will Possible?" (n. 4 above), to Amelie Rorty, "Where Does the Akratic Break Take Place?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1980): 333-46, and many more such titles, the question always appears to be taken to mean "What kind of unfortunate mental glitch causes one to act against one's best judgment?"
28. Thus, he is not acting for what Davidson calls "renegade reasons" - he is not acting for reasons that he already considered and dismissed, but for reasons that he overlooked.
29. Once again, it does not matter whether we take Sam's failure to abide by his decision to be a failure to develop a desire or failure to develop a Davidsonian "absolute" judgment from a Davidsonian "relativized" judgment. In either case, he fails to form the desire/absolute judgment because of good evidence to the affect that the desire/absolute judgment is inappropriate/false, and his only irrationality is in failing to revise the (relativized) judgment he reached by deliberation.
30. Or perhaps, despite wondering what possibly made her stay in the program for so long, she never bothers to examine her reasons for quitting or is unable to cite them due to her lack of introspective skill. Whether or not Emily or Sam come to a reflective understanding of the irrationality of their old best judgments or the reasons for their failure to follow them does not affect my argument for the rationality of this failure.