Against propositionalism

Nous

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 503-518

  Montague, Michelle ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949328914     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00657.x     Document Type: Article

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