Emotions and Values

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages

  Mulligan, Kevin ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA   (Switzerland)

^b Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR)   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Assessments; Emotional lives; Emotions appraisal; Philosophy of emotions; Philosophy of value; Psychology of emotions

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923647767     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235018.003.0022     Document Type: Chapter

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