The strike of the demon: On fitting pro-attitudes and value

Ethics

Volumn 114, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 391-423

  Rabinowicz, Wlodek ^a   Rønnow Rasmussen, Toni ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 4444324344     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/381694     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (104)

1. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value," Ethics 110 (2000): 722-48. Compare also D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 65-90, and "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism)," in Philosophy and the Emotions, ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Roger Crisp, review of Value ... and What Follows, by Joel Kupperman, Philosophy 75 (2000): 458-62.
2. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value," Ethics 110 (2000): 722-48. Compare also D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 65-90, and "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism)," in Philosophy and the Emotions, ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Roger Crisp, review of Value ... and What Follows, by Joel Kupperman, Philosophy 75 (2000): 458-62.
3. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value," Ethics 110 (2000): 722-48. Compare also D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 65-90, and "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism)," in Philosophy and the Emotions, ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Roger Crisp, review of Value ... and What Follows, by Joel Kupperman, Philosophy 75 (2000): 458-62.
4. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value," Ethics 110 (2000): 722-48. Compare also D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 65-90, and "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism)," in Philosophy and the Emotions, ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Roger Crisp, review of Value ... and What Follows, by Joel Kupperman, Philosophy 75 (2000): 458-62.
5. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value," Ethics 110 (2000): 722-48. Compare also D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 65-90, and "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism)," in Philosophy and the Emotions, ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Roger Crisp, review of Value ... and What Follows, by Joel Kupperman, Philosophy 75 (2000): 458-62.
6. D'Arms and Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value," p. 731.
7. In fact, on this pluralist view, value bearers themselves can be found in different ontological categories: value can accrue to such diverse entities as states of affairs, things, and persons. Admirable persons call for admiration, desirable states are fit to be desired, and so on. To make things more complicated, one and the same valuable object may well call for a variety of different kinds of pro-responses. Thus, a piece of antique Chinese porcelain may deserve to be admired but it may also call for protection and care. Such conglomerates of fitting responses will typically vary as one moves from one type of valuable objects to another. For an extended defense of value pluralism along these lines, see Elisabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). Compare also Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 33-49, and "Tropic of Value," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 389-403.
8. In fact, on this pluralist view, value bearers themselves can be found in different ontological categories: value can accrue to such diverse entities as states of affairs, things, and persons. Admirable persons call for admiration, desirable states are fit to be desired, and so on. To make things more complicated, one and the same valuable object may well call for a variety of different kinds of pro-responses. Thus, a piece of antique Chinese porcelain may deserve to be admired but it may also call for protection and care. Such conglomerates of fitting responses will typically vary as one moves from one type of valuable objects to another. For an extended defense of value pluralism along these lines, see Elisabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). Compare also Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 33-49, and "Tropic of Value," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 389-403.
9. In fact, on this pluralist view, value bearers themselves can be found in different ontological categories: value can accrue to such diverse entities as states of affairs, things, and persons. Admirable persons call for admiration, desirable states are fit to be desired, and so on. To make things more complicated, one and the same valuable object may well call for a variety of different kinds of pro-responses. Thus, a piece of antique Chinese porcelain may deserve to be admired but it may also call for protection and care. Such conglomerates of fitting responses will typically vary as one moves from one type of valuable objects to another. For an extended defense of value pluralism along these lines, see Elisabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). Compare also Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 33-49, and "Tropic of Value," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2003): 389-403.
10. Franz Brentano, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, trans. Roderick Chisholm (1889; reprint, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 18.
11. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
12. Chisholm's translation deviates from the German original but may still be faithful to it in spirit. On this point, see J. N. Findlay, Axiological Ethics (London: Macmillan St. Martin's Press, 1970), pp. 21-22.
13. Brentano, p. 18.
14. Ibid., p. 25.
15. Ibid., p. 26.
16. Compare Findlay, pp. 25-26. For a modern exponent of the Brentano-inspired approach to FA analysis, see Kevin Mulligan, "From Appropriate Emotions to Values," Monist 81 (1998): 161-88.
17. Compare Findlay, pp. 25-26. For a modern exponent of the Brentano-inspired approach to FA analysis, see Kevin Mulligan, "From Appropriate Emotions to Values," Monist 81 (1998): 161-88.
18. C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930), p. 283.
19. W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1939), pp. 276, 278.
20. At least, if a is an action. If it instead is an experience of pleasure, then-insofar it is valuable-it is a fitting object of "satisfaction" rather than admiration (ibid.).
21. Ibid., p. 279.
22. Whether this circularity would be vicious depends on what the analysis is supposed to achieve. As Justin D'Arms has reminded us, among modern defenders of FA analysis, Wiggins accepts the circularity and argues that, due to its "detour through sentiments," the analysis nevertheless is informative to some extent; see David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" essay 5 in David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 189. Compare D'Arms and Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value," pp. 732-33.
23. Whether this circularity would be vicious depends on what the analysis is supposed to achieve. As Justin D'Arms has reminded us, among modern defenders of FA analysis, Wiggins accepts the circularity and argues that, due to its "detour through sentiments," the analysis nevertheless is informative to some extent; see David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism?" essay 5 in David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 189. Compare D'Arms and Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value," pp. 732-33.
24. A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (London: Macmillan, 1947), p. 152. Among adherents of the FA analysis, one should also mention Richard Brandt, who in "Moral Valuation," Ethics 56 (1946): 106-21, suggested that "X is Yable" (admirable, contemptible, etc.) "means that X is a fitting (or suitable) object of Y-attitude" (p. 113).
25. A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (London: Macmillan, 1947), p. 152. Among adherents of the FA analysis, one should also mention Richard Brandt, who in "Moral Valuation," Ethics 56 (1946): 106-21, suggested that "X is Yable" (admirable, contemptible, etc.) "means that X is a fitting (or suitable) object of Y-attitude" (p. 113).
26. Ewing, The Definition of Good, p. 149.
27. Ibid., pp. 166-67.
28. Ibid., p. 158.
29. Ibid., p. 172.
30. Ewing is not alone in his view that pro-attitudes need not involve any evaluations. In "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism)," D'Arms and Jacobson present a critique of various forms of judgmentalism and quasijudgmentalism in treatment of emotions. In their view, emotions such as admiration, envy, etc., do not essentially involve any judgment of value, nor do they even require the agent to entertain any evaluative thoughts. Evaluative language may be highly useful for describing emotions, but the evaluative concepts that are employed in such descriptions need not correspond to any "phenomenological" reality in the emotion itself. Consequently, like Ewing, D'Arms and Jacobson reject the Ross-style circularity objection to FA analysis.
31. Compare Jonathan Dancy, "Should We Pass the Buck?" in Philosophy, the Good, the True and the Beautiful, ed. Anthony O'Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 159-75: "Ewing seems ... to be in a position to say that goodness is not a distinctive property of objects, one ... to which we should respond with approval and admiration. The goodness of the object just is the relational fact that we should respond to it with approval, admiration or other pro-attitude. The evaluative 'good' has been defined in terms of the deontic 'should'. And with this result, the intuitionists reversed Moore's position. ... Moore defined the right, that which we ought to do or should do, in terms of the good. Ewing defined the good in terms of how we should respond" (p. 161).
32. A. C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), pp. 86, 90.
33. To avoid misunderstandings, here and in what follows the notion of a reason is supposed to have an "objective" reading: the existence of reasons for pro-attitudes toward an object is not supposed to be dependent on our beliefs. We might be ignorant about the features of the object that provide reasons for a pro-attitude, but this ignorance on our part does not make such features any less reason-providing.
34. Ewing, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy, pp. 88-89.
35. Ibid., pp. 92-93.
36. Ibid., pp. 98-100.
37. O. K. Bouwsma, Wittgenstein: Conversations, 1949-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986), pp. 41-42; this passage is also quoted in Mulligan.
38. Rawls provides the following FA analysis of the attributive usage of 'good': "A is a good X if and only if A has the properties (to a higher degree than the average or standard X) which it is rational to want in an X, given what X's are used for, or expected to do, and the like (whichever rider is appropriate)" (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971], p. 399).
39. According to McDowell, both values and secondary qualities, such as color, sound, etc., are analyzable in terms of certain hypothetical reactions on the part of the subject. However, the two cases are not quite analogous: "The disanalogy, now, is that a virtue (say) is conceived to be not merely such as to elicit the appropriate 'attitude' (as a color is merely such as to cause the appropriate experiences), but rather such as to merit it" (John McDowell, "Values and Secondary Qualities," in Morality and Objectivity, ed. Ted Honderich [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985], pp. 110-29, p. 118).
40. On Chisholm's proposal, A is intrinsically preferable to B if and only if "A and B are necessarily such that, that for any x, the contemplation of just A and B by x requires that x prefer A to B" (Roderick M. Chisholm, Brentano and Intrinsic Value [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986], p. 52).
41. "It has been noted that for 'x is good' one may substitute ... 'x would be a fitting object of a pro-attitude', and there are other substitutions: 'x deserves favor', 'x would justify favor' and 'there is a case for favoring x'. One may interpret these sentences as expressing the claim that x has a power to evoke favor by way of true comprehension of what it is like. ... Goodness or value on this showing would be a dispositional property of things as truly comprehended, and it would be defined in terms partly psychological and partly not: in terms of power to evoke responses, but responses as they ultimately would be in the ideal case of a perfect, no-further-corrigible, comprehension of the things in question" (W. D. Falk, "Fact, Value, and Nonnatural Predication," in his Ought, Reasons and Morality [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986], pp. 99-122, pp. 117-18). We are indebted to Stephen Darwall for this reference to Falk.
42. "x is good if and only if x is the sort of thing that calls forth or makes appropriate a certain sentiment of approbation given the range of propensities that we actually have to respond in this or that way" (Wiggins, p. 206). This applies not just to "good" but to other value properties as well, for each of which there is "an attitude or response" that is appropriate. Wiggins takes this account of value to be essentially relativistic: "The relativity to us that is here in question consists in the fact that it is we who owe x the response A. ... What this relativity imports is the possibility that there may be simply no point in urging that a stranger to our associations owes the object this response" (ibid., pp. 202-3).
43. The FA pattern of analysis is advocated by Gibbard for a whole range of moral and evaluative notions. "All these notions concern the way it makes sense to feel about things people do, the feelings that are warranted" (Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment [Oxford: Clarendon, 1990], p. 51). See also his "Preference and Preferability," in Preferences, Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy, ed. Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998), p. 241: "To be desirable, we might say, is to be desired fittingly, or justifiably, or rationally. Or since a desirable thing might not be desired at all, we should speak hypothetically: something is desirable if it would be reasonable to desire it. It is desirable if desiring it would be warranted, if it would make sense to desire it, if a desire for it would be fitting or rational. Likewise, the preferable thing is the one it would be rational to prefer."
44. The FA pattern of analysis is advocated by Gibbard for a whole range of moral and evaluative notions. "All these notions concern the way it makes sense to feel about things people do, the feelings that are warranted" (Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment [Oxford: Clarendon, 1990], p. 51). See also his "Preference and Preferability," in Preferences, Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy, ed. Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998), p. 241: "To be desirable, we might say, is to be desired fittingly, or justifiably, or rationally. Or since a desirable thing might not be desired at all, we should speak hypothetically: something is desirable if it would be reasonable to desire it. It is desirable if desiring it would be warranted, if it would make sense to desire it, if a desire for it would be fitting or rational. Likewise, the preferable thing is the one it would be rational to prefer."
45. "To experience something as good is to be favourably aroused by it-to be inspired, attracted, interested, pleased, awed. ... To value something is to have a complex of positive attitudes toward it. ... To experience something as valuable and to value it are not to judge that it is valuable. ... To judge that something is good is to judge that it is properly valued" (Anderson, pp. 1-2).
46. "I suggest that we can explicate intrinsic goodness and badness, and other related value concepts in terms of such concepts as 'being intrinsically worthy of love' and 'being intrinsically worthy of hate'. But what is it for a state of affairs to be intrinsically worthy of love or hate? I propose to follow Chisholm in explicating such concepts in terms of the notion of 'ethical requirement'" (Noah M. Lemos, Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], p. 12).
47. In a footnote, though, he mentions Rawls and refers to a short passage in Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), p. 60 (cf. T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998], p. 384).
48. In a footnote, though, he mentions Rawls and refers to a short passage in Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), p. 60 (cf. T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998], p. 384).
49. Scanlon, p. 97.
50. Ibid., p. 95.
51. See Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake," and "Tropic of Value."
52. We are indebted to Tim Scanlon for raising this issue (in private communication).
53. Ewing, The Definition of Good, p. 149.
54. We are obliged to Justin D'Arms for pressing this point.
55. D'Arms and Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value."
56. Crisp, p. 459.
57. Compare Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, in The Works of Bishop Butler (1729), vol. 1, ed. J. H. Bernard (London: Macmillan, 1900), preface, sec. 31, and sermon xi, sec. 1.9; see also Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1907), pp. 136, 403.
58. Compare Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, in The Works of Bishop Butler (1729), vol. 1, ed. J. H. Bernard (London: Macmillan, 1900), preface, sec. 31, and sermon xi, sec. 1.9; see also Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1907), pp. 136, 403.
59. D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions," p. 69.
60. Derek Parfit, "Rationality and Reasons," in Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Action to Values, ed. Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson, and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 17-41.
61. Parfit, pp. 21-22.
62. We are indebted to Justin D'Arms for raising this issue.
63. Sydney Shoemaker, "Causality and Properties," in Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, ed. Peter Van Invagen (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1980), pp. 109-35.
64. We owe this suggestion to Mark LeBar.
65. Cambridge properties can of course ground value properties that themselves are Cambridge-like, as, say, the property of being five kilometers to the north from an admirable person. This property may supervene on the Cambridge property of being five kilometers to the north of an unselfish person. But while they cannot be expressed in a nonevaluative language, Cambridge-like value properties are not values, of course. At least, an adherent of the FA analysis of value would claim that they are not since an object might possess such a value property without it being the case that it calls for any proattitude.
66. One might think the answer has to do with the fact that, at least in the evil-demon cases, the subject is forced to have the pro-attitude, by a threat of punishment. The FA analysis, on this proposal, should only accept as right kind of reasons those reasons that we would have under appropriately idealized circumstances. Absence of threats would be a natural component in such an idealization. This way of dealing with the problem at hand is, however, unsatisfactory: in the first place, no threats are present in the hedonist case, and the evil-demon cases could be reformulated: we could replace the threat of punishment with a promise of reward. One might reply that, in the idealized circumstances, such promises should be excluded as well. More generally, the circumstances are ideal only if nothing else hinges on whether the subject has a pro-attitude or not: the attitude has no further effects. However, this will not do either, and not just because envisaging such very hypothetical situations seems to be quite difficult. More importantly, an idealization like this would not manage to exclude all the counterexamples to the FA analysis: pro-attitudes might have value that is based on their intrinsic features rather than just on their external effects (as we have seen was the case according to mental state axiologies).
67. More precisely, on Moore's view, the intrinsic value of an object can be based on two kinds of properties: the internal ones and the ones that are 'internally relational', so to speak. The latter accrue to the object in virtue of its relations to its own parts or constituents. Thus, like the former, they can in principle accrue to the object in all possible contexts in which the object could be placed (cf. G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922], pp. 261-62, and Principia Ethica, rev. ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], pp. 26-27).
68. More precisely, on Moore's view, the intrinsic value of an object can be based on two kinds of properties: the internal ones and the ones that are 'internally relational', so to speak. The latter accrue to the object in virtue of its relations to its own parts or constituents. Thus, like the former, they can in principle accrue to the object in all possible contexts in which the object could be placed (cf. G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922], pp. 261-62, and Principia Ethica, rev. ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], pp. 26-27).
69. Mark LeBar's comments have alerted us to this problem.
70. Compare Brentano, p. 18; and Ewing, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy, p. 86.
71. Compare Brentano, p. 18; and Ewing, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy, p. 86.
72. For some problems with such a proposal, see Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Instrumental Values-Strong and Weak," Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (2002): 23-43.
73. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake," p. 49. Compare also Christine M. Korsgaard, "Two Distinctions in Goodness," in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 249-74, reprinted from Philosophical Review 42 (1983): 169-95; John O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," Monist 75 (1992): 119-37; Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value"; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Tropic of Value."
74. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake," p. 49. Compare also Christine M. Korsgaard, "Two Distinctions in Goodness," in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 249-74, reprinted from Philosophical Review 42 (1983): 169-95; John O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," Monist 75 (1992): 119-37; Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value"; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Tropic of Value."
75. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake," p. 49. Compare also Christine M. Korsgaard, "Two Distinctions in Goodness," in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 249-74, reprinted from Philosophical Review 42 (1983): 169-95; John O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," Monist 75 (1992): 119-37; Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value"; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Tropic of Value."
76. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake," p. 49. Compare also Christine M. Korsgaard, "Two Distinctions in Goodness," in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 249-74, reprinted from Philosophical Review 42 (1983): 169-95; John O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," Monist 75 (1992): 119-37; Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value"; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Tropic of Value."
77. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake," p. 49. Compare also Christine M. Korsgaard, "Two Distinctions in Goodness," in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 249-74, reprinted from Philosophical Review 42 (1983): 169-95; John O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," Monist 75 (1992): 119-37; Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value"; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Tropic of Value."
78. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake," p. 49. Compare also Christine M. Korsgaard, "Two Distinctions in Goodness," in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 249-74, reprinted from Philosophical Review 42 (1983): 169-95; John O'Neill, "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," Monist 75 (1992): 119-37; Kagan, "Rethinking Intrinsic Value"; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, "Tropic of Value."
79. One could try to avoid final nonintrinsic values by means of a reductionist maneuver: suppose it could be shown that, in the last analysis, the value of an object is reducible to the value of "propositional" entities, such as states of affairs or facts. To illustrate, what has final value on this view is not Diana's dress but rather the fact that Diana's dress exists or that this dress has belonged to Diana. If it could be established that final value ultimately accrues to facts alone, then the claim that all final value is intrinsic would become quite plausible: the features that make a fact valuable for its own sake may plausibly be assumed to be intrinsic to the fact in question. In the papers referred to above, we have argued against such reduction, but this argument has not been left unchallenged. For some objections, see secs. 3.1 and 3.2 in Michael J. Zimmerman, The Nature of Intrinsic Value (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), and "Intrinsic Value and Individual Worth," in Egonsson et al., eds., pp. 123-38. Since Zimmerman adheres to the view that all final value is intrinsic, he can develop an FA-style analysis of final value that avoids the WKR objection: on that analysis, presented in The Nature of Intrinsic Value, chap. 4, the right reasons for favoring a state are provided by that state's internal nature. As Zimmerman puts it, the state must be favored "for its being what it is ... and not for the sake of its relation to some other valuable state" (ibid., p. 91).
80. One could try to avoid final nonintrinsic values by means of a reductionist maneuver: suppose it could be shown that, in the last analysis, the value of an object is reducible to the value of "propositional" entities, such as states of affairs or facts. To illustrate, what has final value on this view is not Diana's dress but rather the fact that Diana's dress exists or that this dress has belonged to Diana. If it could be established that final value ultimately accrues to facts alone, then the claim that all final value is intrinsic would become quite plausible: the features that make a fact valuable for its own sake may plausibly be assumed to be intrinsic to the fact in question. In the papers referred to above, we have argued against such reduction, but this argument has not been left unchallenged. For some objections, see secs. 3.1 and 3.2 in Michael J. Zimmerman, The Nature of Intrinsic Value (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), and "Intrinsic Value and Individual Worth," in Egonsson et al., eds., pp. 123-38. Since Zimmerman adheres to the view that all final value is intrinsic, he can develop an FA-style analysis of final value that avoids the WKR objection: on that analysis, presented in The Nature of Intrinsic Value, chap. 4, the right reasons for favoring a state are provided by that state's internal nature. As Zimmerman puts it, the state must be favored "for its being what it is ... and not for the sake of its relation to some other valuable state" (ibid., p. 91).
81. Parfit, p. 24.
82. Ibid., p. 25.
83. Ibid., p. 27.
84. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgement, p. 37.
85. They are by no means alone in this claim. For example, John Skorupski takes the same view in his unpublished work on reasons. Note also that an analogous claim is often made with respect to doxastic attitudes: beneficial effects of a belief can be reasons for wanting to have that belief or for trying to have it, but it is denied that that they can be reasons to believe.
86. D'Arms and Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value."
87. Their example differs from Gibbard's, but here we paraphrase what they say using Gibbard's example.
88. Gibbard, p. 744.
89. Compare chap. 1, secs. 2-9 (and esp. p. 13, where the label "rational irrationality" is introduced) in Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
90. Compare, e.g., Broad's insistence on the subject of the pro-attitude having "an adequate idea of [the object's] non-ethical characteristics" (Broad, p. 283) or Falk's suggestion that it is a matter of favoring the object "by way of true comprehension of what it is like" (Falk, p. 117).
91. Note that this duality of roles characterizes both the properties that make an object valuable for its own sake and the properties that make it valuable as a means. On our interpretation of the FA analysis, this format of analysis is just as applicable to instrumental value as to final value. The instrumental property that provides a reason for favoring an object as a means should at the same time be the property on account of which we favor that object as a means, if the object is to have an instrumental value.
92. It is another thing that this move to a value judgment need not always be correct. I might favor x on account of it being P, even though P does not make favoring x justified; either because x in fact lacks P or because x's having P is not an acceptable reason to favor x in the first place.
93. What features would fit the bill depends on what we are supposed to desire for its own sake in this case: is it that we have the saucer of mud, that we eat the mud, or something else? The example is underdescribed in this respect.
94. But suppose the evil demon is even more perverse than we have assumed. Suppose he demands of us, under a threat of punishment, not just that we desire the saucer of mud for its own sake but that we desire it for its own sake precisely on account of it being such that desiring it in this way would shield us from punishment. What then? Under such circumstances, the reason for the desire would at the same time be the feature on account of which we are supposed to desire the object. Would this make it a reason of the right kind? On our interpretation of the FA analysis, it appears we should have to admit this. It would be nice if we could resist this objection and argue that the attitude the perverse demon requires of us is conceptually impossible and thus nothing that we can have reasons for. It certainly does appear to be psychologically impossible to desire something for its own sake on account of the fact that this desire would have beneficial effects. No sane person would be able to have such an attitude. But a psychological impossibility is not the same as a conceptual inconsistency. If the demands of the perverse demon in this imagined example are conceptually coherent, then our interpretation of the FA analysis founders for cases like this. Still, since this counterexample is so contrived in its lack of psychological realism, the difficulty appears to be rather marginal. A less contrived counterexample will, however, be considered in the next section.
95. We owe this objection to Jonas Olson. He has also provided us with another example that illustrates this problem. On the strong reading of the paradox of hedonism, hedonism not only implies that we have reasons to pursue other things, apart from pleasure, for their own sake, but also that we have reasons not to pursue pleasure itself in this way: striving for pleasure, for its own sake, is self-defeating on this view. Note also that all the examples of the wrong kind of reasons with which D'Arms and Jacobson (see their "Sentiment and Value") illustrate the conflation problem are of this kind: they concern cases in which we have reasons not to have pro-attitudes toward valuable objects.
96. We are indebted to Sven Danielsson for getting us to think of the difficulties involved in the enterprise of aggregation. For example, can right counterreasons undercut rather than simply override right reasons for favoring? It seems that such undercutting might sometimes be possible: prima facie, we have a reason to admire a person for her courage, but this reason is undercut, it seems, if it is the courage of a murderer. It appears, therefore, that whether a certain property of an object does provide a right reason for favoring may depend on other properties of that object. To take another example of an aggregation problem, suppose that one property of an object provides a right reason for favor and another property gives an independent right reason for disfavor. Say, we have a reason to admire a person for her courage but also a reason to despise her for deceitfulness. Assume we come to the conclusion that the former reason overrides the latter: taking both features into account, favoring is more appropriate, on balance. But what sort of favoring are we then talking about? And on account of what features? Is it on account of the conjunctive property courage-and-deceitfulness? But surely, deceitfulness is despicable. So how can we favor her on the account of both features taken together? It seems we should favor her on-account-of-her-courage-and-despite- her-deceitfulness. But this makes the pro-attitudes toward the object even more complex in their intentional content than we have heretofore assumed.
97. There is some self-reflexivity in the attitude required by the demon: we are to admire him, for his own sake, for his readiness to punish us if we do not admire him for that feature. But this self-reflexivity need not make the required attitude incoherent. Thus, the demon's demand need not be conceptually impossible to fulfill. Nor, as we are going to argue, is there any psychological impossibility in this case. In that respect, Tersman's example differs from the case of a perverse demon who asks us to desire, for its own sake, a lump of mud, and to do it precisely on account of the beneficial effects of that very desire.
98. Mark LeBar has suggested this objection in his comments.
99. It may not be such a good counterexample after all. Stephen Darwall (in private communication) questions its psychological plausibility: "It is true that it is possible to admire a person for his threatening and frightening way. But that is not the same thing as admiring him because he is threatening you. [And it is this latter circumstance that is the precise reason why you should admire him.] So, in the case at hand, we are not admiring him, for his own sake, 'precisely on account of his determination to punish us if we don't'. ... I don't think it is psychologically possible to admire someone for the reason that one would be harmed if one doesn't. ... And that is so even though it is quite possible to admire someone for being a threatening person." Darwall may be right on this point but what he claims is not obviously true: it is not obvious that people never are able to feel a masochistic admiration. Why should it be psychologically impossible to admire our would-be tormentors at least in part precisely on account of the torment they are determined to inflict upon us if we don't obey their commands? Anyway, even if Darwall is right and the example after all lacks psychological realism, the problem will still stand if such cases at least are conceptually possible.
100. Compare D'Arms and Jacobson, "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion."
101. On second thought, this may have been what Darwall was after in his comments. We can admire the demon for his threatening ways, but the way that feature of the demon justifies our attitude is different from the way it is being admired: our admiration is justified simply because we have an interest not to be harmed.
102. Compare D'Arms and Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value."
103. One of the editors of this journal has with some justification described our article as an example of "philosophical bait and switch." On a very natural reading of "fitting" or "worthy," the WKR problem does not arise for the classical versions of the FA analysis, in which expressions such as these play a crucial role. That problem only emerges when the special notions of fittingness or worthiness are replaced by generic deontic constructions, such as "ought" or "reason."
104. Unless we are mistaken, this seems to be the position D'Arms and Jacobson take in their "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions." As they put it, "emotions present things to us as having certain evaluative features. When we ask whether an emotion is fitting, ... we ask about the correctness of these presentations" (ibid., p. 72). Thus, it is fitting to feel F in response to X, where F is an emotion that represents X as having Φ if the evaluative representation F contains is correct, i.e., insofar as X does have the evaluative property Φ. The authors emphasize that the representation in question is not a judgment that X has Φ but, rather, a form of appearance: in an emotion, X appears to have Φ. (In their later paper, "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion [or, Anti- Quasijudgmentalism]," D'Arms and Jacobson go even further and suggest that that the emotion itself, as distinct from its description, need not involve any evaluative notions.) But the relevant point, in the present context, is that fittingness on this view is supposed to consist in some relation of adequacy between the emotion and the value of its object.