A priori power measures and the institutions of the European Union

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 161-179

  Nurmi, Hannu ^a   Meskanen, Tommi ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033244907     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.00445     Document Type: Article

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