Explaining All Three-Alternative Voting Outcomes

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 87, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 313-355

  Saari, Donald G ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001461786     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2541     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. K. J. Arrow, "Social Choice and Individual Values," 2nd ed., Wiley, New York, 1963.
2. D. Austen-Smith and J. S. Banks, "Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory," Discussion paper 1196, Northwestern University, Oct. 1997.
3. D. Black, "The Theory of Committees and Elections," Cambridge Univ. Press, London, 1958.
4. J. C. Borda, "Mémoire sur les élections au scrutin," Histoire de l'Académie Royale des Sciences, Paris, 1781.
5. M. Condorcet, "Éssai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix," Paris, 1785.
6. A. H. Copeland, "A reasonable social welfare function," mimeo, Department of Mathematics, University of Michigan, 1951.
7. G. Debreu, Excess demand functions, J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974), 15-23.
8. D. Haunsperger, Dictionaries of paradoxes for statistical tests on k samples, J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 87 (1992), 149-155.
9. J. Kelly, Social choice bibliography, Soc. Choice Welfare 4 (1987), 287-294.
10. J. Kemeny, Mathematics without numbers, Daedalus 88 (1959), 571-591.
11. M. Le Breton and M. Truchon, A Borda measure for social choice functions, Math. Soc. Sci. 34 (1997), 249-272.
12. R. Mantel, On the characterization of aggregate excess demand, J. Econ. Theory 7 (1972), 348-353.
13. R. D. McKelvey, General conditions for global intransitivities in formal voting models, Econometrica 47 (1979), 1085-1112.
14. V. Merlin and D. G. Saari, Copeland method II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes, J. Econ. Theory 72 (1997), 148-172.
15. I. McLean and F. Hewitt, "Condorcet," Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1994.
16. I. McLean and A. B. Urken, "Classics of Social Choice," Univ. of Michigan Press, Ann Arbir, 1995.
17. E. J. Nanson, Methods of elections, Trans. Proc. R. Soc. Victoria 18 (1882), 197-240.
18. D. Richards, Intransitivities in multidimensional spatial voting: period three implies chaos, Soc. Choice Welfare 11 (1994), 109-119.
19. W. Riker, "Liberalism Against Populism," Freeman, San Francisco, 1982.
20. D. G. Saari, A dictionary for voting paradoxes, J. Econ. Theory 48 (1989), 443-475.
21. D. G. Saari, Borda Dictionary, Soc. Choice Welfare 7 (1990), 279-317.
22. D. G. Saari, The aggregate excess demand function and other aggregation procedures, Economic Theory 2 (1992), 359-388.
23. D. G. Saari, Millions of election rankings from a single profile, Soc. Choice Welfare 9 (1992), 277-306.
24. D. G. Saari, "Geometry of Voting," Springer-Verlag, Berlin/New York, 1994.
25. D. G. Saari, A chaotic exploration of aggregation paradoxes, SIAM Rev. 37 (1995), 37-52.
26. D. G. Saari, Mathematical complexity of simple economics, Notices Amer. Math. Soc. 42 (1995), 222-230.
27. D. G. Saari, "Basic Geometry of Voting," Springer-Verlag, Berlin/New York, 1995.
28. D. G. Saari, Informational geometry of social choice, Soc. Choice Welfare 14 (1997), 211-232.
29. D. G. Saari, "Explaining Positional Voting Paradoxes I & II," Discussion Paper, Northwestern University, Jan. and April 1997. [To appear in Econ. Theory 15 (2000), 1-103]
30. D. G. Saari, "Explaining Positional Voting Paradoxes I & II," Discussion Paper, Northwestern University, Jan. and April 1997. [To appear in Econ. Theory 15 (2000), 1-103]
31. D. G. Saari, Connecting and resolving Arrow's and Sen's Theorems, Soc. Choice Welfare, 15 (1998), 239-261.
32. D. G. Saari and V. Merlin, Copeland method I: Relationships and the dictionary, Economic Theory 8 (1996), 51-76.
33. D. G. Saari and V. Merlin, Geometry of Kemeny's rule. [Soc. Choice Welfare, to appear]
34. D. G. Saari and M. Tataru, The likelihood of dubious election outcomes, Econ. Theory 13 (1999), 345-363.
35. M. A. Salles, A general possibility theorem for group decision rules with Pareto-transitivity, J. Econ. Theory 9 (1975).
36. N. Schofield (ed.), "Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy," Kluwer Acedemic, Dordrecht/Norwell, MA, 1996.
37. A. K. Sen, A possibility theorem on majority decisions, Econometrica 34 (1966), 491-499.
38. K. Sieberg, "Using Probability to Understand Election Outcomes," preprint, Department of Politics, New York University, 1994.
39. H. Sonnenshein, Market excess demand functions, Econometrica 40 (1972), 649-663.
40. H. Sonnenshein, Do Walras' identity and continuity characterize the class of community excess demand functions? J. Econ. Theory 6 (1973), 345-354.
41. J. von Newenhizen, The Borda count is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle, Econ. Theory 2 (1992), 69-83.
42. J. Weymark, "Aggregating Ordinal Probabilities on Finite Sets," Discussion paper 94-19, 1994.
43. W. S. Zwicker, The voters' paradox, spini, and the Borda count, Math. Soc. Sci. 22 (1991), 187-227.